Revista Gestão & Conexões
Management and Connections Journal
Vitória (ES), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
iSSn: 2317-5087
Doi: https://doi.org/10.47456/regec.2317-5087.2024.13.3.43188.182.203
Artigo submetido em: 08.12.2023 Aceito em: 03.04.2024 PublicAdo em: 02.09.2024
Municipal Fiscal Performance: does the Human Capital make
a difference?
ABSTRACT
This research aims to verify whether mayors’ and councilors’ Human Capital influences the fiscal
performance of Brazilian municipalities. The existing literature attributes the fiscal results of municipal
management to mayors. However, taking into consideration the Human Capital Theory, we sought
to verify the influence of the legislative municipal power on this issue. The sample was comprised
of Brazilian municipalities from 2013 to 2019. Quantitative descriptive methodology with longitudinal
section and multiple linear regression was used to analyze the phenomena discussed in this research.
The fiscal performance was measured based on the Fiscal Autonomy Index (IAF), general IFGF, IFGF
autonomy, IFGF personnel, IFGF liquidity, and IFGF investment. To measure Human Capital, the following
information was considered: one’s education level, age, and occupation in public administration before
inauguration. The results demonstrated that the Human Capital influences most components of fiscal
performance, but the experience of councilors is not beneficial for fiscal management.
Palavras-chave: Human Capital; fiscal performance; mayors and councilors.
RESUMO
Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo verificar se o Capital Humano de prefeitos e vereadores influencia
o desempenho fiscal dos municípios brasileiros. A literatura existente atribui os resultados fiscais
da gestão municipal aos prefeitos. Contudo, levando em consideração a Teoria do Capital Humano,
procuramos verificar a influência do poder legislativo municipal nesta questão. A amostra foi composta
por municípios brasileiros de 2013 a 2019. Utilizou-se a metodologia descritiva quantitativa com corte
longitudinal e regressão linear múltipla para analisar os fenômenos discutidos nesta pesquisa. O
desempenho fiscal foi medido com base no Índice de Autonomia Fiscal (IAF), IFGF geral, autonomia
do IFGF, pessoal do IFGF, liquidez do IFGF e investimento do IFGF. Para mensurar o Capital Humano
foram consideradas as seguintes informações: escolaridade, idade e ocupação na administração
pública antes da posse. Os resultados mostraram que o Capital Humano dos prefeitos e vereadores
tem influência no desempenho fiscal em termos gerais.
Keywords: Capital Humano; Desempenho fiscal; Prefeitos e vereadores.
Lucilene Rodrigues de Melo
Fucape Business School
lucilenermelo@hotmail.com
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9691-8996
Olavo Venturim Caldas
Fucape Business School
olavoventurim@fucape.br
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9188-3061
Desempenho Fiscal Municipal: o Capital Humano faz diferença?
183
LuciLene RodRigues de MeLo | oLavo ventuRiM caLdas
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
Introduction
The mayor is considered the head of management in local public administration,
unifying the political and administrative functions (Avellaneda, 2009; Avellaneda &
Gomes, 2015, 2017). The manager's managerial capacity influences fiscal results as
he or she is primarily responsible for the municipality's strategic decisions (Avellaneda,
2009; Avellaneda & Gomes, 2015; Freier & Thomasius, 2016; Gallina et al., 2019;
Gomes et al., 2013; Rocha et al., 2018).
The literature points out that the education and experience of municipal
managers make a difference in the direction of management; the combination of
these characteristics is the basis of the Human Capital (HC) theory disseminated by
Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961), and Becker (1994).
Corroborating this understanding, research has analyzed the influence of the
municipal manager's level of education and experience on management performance
(Avellaneda & Gomes, 2015, 2017; Freier & Thomasius, 2016; Gallina et al., 2019;
Rocha et al., 2018; Silva & Sales, 2018). However, there are no studies that consider the
relationship between the level of education and experience of members of the legislature
and the fiscal results achieved by local administrative units. Management success is
linked to the political support of the legislature, but management results are mostly
attributable to the mayor's HC (Avellaneda & Gomes, 2009). Nonetheless, relations
based on the legal system of a democratic state of law have assigned to the legislative
power the functions of control, supervision, and regulation of public administration
structures, and qualify it as an instrument of governance (Fiscal Responsibility Law
[LRF], 2000; Lui, 2017; Kissler & Heidemann, 2006; Federal Court of Auditors [TCU],
2014). According to Travaglia and Sá (2017), public governance has its origins in
corporate governance, based on Jensen and Meckling's Agency Theory (1976). In
this context, corporate and public governance are similar in nature. Therefore, it is
understood that in the public sector, politicians are agents who represent the interests
of the principal, the people.
From a governance perspective, the legislative power is like the board of directors
of private companies, due to the representation of interests. Thus, research shows
that the HC of board members influences company performance in the private sector
(Nguyen et al., 2017; Valenti & Horner, 2020; Khanna et al., 2014).
In the studies by Nguyen et al. (2017), the findings indicate that qualifications,
skills, and experience are components that can increase the credibility of the board
of directors of Vietnamese companies, strengthening their image and generating
financial benefits.
As in the private sector, where HC is recognized as a productivity factor, research
in the public sector has shown that it is not only the HC of the municipal manager that
contributes to improving performance, but also that of the civil servants who carry out
operational activities, as shown by the studies by Cardoso and Marenco (2019) and
Marenco, Strohschoen and Joner (2017). These authors found evidence that the level
of education of civil servants contributes to better results in the Gini index, MHDI, and
in the collection of Urban Property Tax (IPTU).
184
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
This context led to the following question: Does the HC of mayors and councilors
influence fiscal results?
To answer this question, this research aimed to verify the influence of the HC
of mayors and councilors (level of education and experience) on fiscal performance.
Existing studies have focused on capturing the influence of mayors' education
and experience on their tax collection capacity. This research, however, takes up this
line of investigation by including the Fiscal Autonomy Index (IAF), based on the studies
by Gomes et al. (2013) and Gallina et al. (2019), and also broadens the scope by
using the Firjan Fiscal Management Index (IFGF) as the dependent variable and its
four data strands: autonomy, personnel expenses, liquidity and investment, expanding
the analysis to other factors that have not yet been tested.
The aim is to establish a new understanding of the literature on the sharing
of responsibilities between mayors and councilors, who submit the administrative
influences of the legislative power to party-political interests (Avellaneda & Gomes,
2017; Demir & Reddick, 2012; Santiso, 2005).
In any case, it must be realized that decisions have political influences, especially
in the management structure adopted in Brazil. In the study by Wei (2020), which
analyses analyzes municipal political and administrative structures, the best fiscal
results are attributed to the structure that values the qualifications and experience of
the manager. This shows that the fiscal efficiency of management can be reduced
due to political decisions.
Regardless of the legal functions, the sharing of administrative responsibilities
between the executive and the legislature should be part of governance designs
and contribute to the performance of the administration, even in localities where the
political-administrative structure is formed by the mayor-council and manager-council
figures (Lui, 2017; Wei, 2020; Demir & Reddick, 2012).
In addition to sharing, according to Askim (2009), a qualified politician has a
holistic view of the federative entity, including all its political, administrative, economic,
and social functions, and from this perception can assign functions and interpret
information in such a way as to construct their own opinions that are in line with what
society expects.
This research is relevant given the breadth of the sample and the inclusion of
the profile of the city councils, analyzing their relevance in all Brazilian municipalities.
In this way, it reflects on the co-responsibility of legislative chambers about the fiscal
results of local public administration, assuming that the educational background and
experience of councilors can be just as important as that of managers, consequently,
contributing to new conceptions regarding the eligibility prerequisites of politicians
and their political-administrative accountability.
The research was based on secondary, quantitative, and longitudinal data collected
from public databases, and statistical analyses were carried out using multiple linear
regression in Stata® software. The findings suggest that the level of education of
mayors and councilors correlates positively with the IAF, general IFGF, and autonomy
IFGF; however, the administrative experience of councilors hurts the proposed indices.
185
LuciLene RodRigues de MeLo | oLavo ventuRiM caLdas
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
Theoretical background
Human Capital
The HC theory has its origins in the studies of Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961) and
Becker (1994), and is defined as the union of formal education, skills, and experience.
It emerged as a counterpoint to the Economic Growth Theory, which stated that a
nation's wealth is made up of the factors of production: capital, natural resources, and
labor (Viana & Lima, 2010).
For Becker (1994), HC can be defined as the union of formal education and training
added together over the course of an individual's career, capable of generating monetary
or non-monetary benefits and adding value as a professional and human being.
In the private sector, discussions around the importance, constitution, and
preservation of HC as a factor of performance, productivity, and competitiveness are
recurrent (Nguyen et al., 2017; Khanna, 2013; Valenti & Horner, 2020).
Khanna et al. (2014) related the HC of 5,700 directors in 650 Fortune 1000
companies about ROA and ROE, concluding that the HC of the board of directors
influences the overall performance of companies. The authors not only presented
the importance and benefits of the HC of the directors who make up the corporate
governance structure but also pointed out that the overload of members can limit the
functions of the board of directors and the utilization of the directors' capacity due
to cognitive limitations and the ability to process information, even when they have
significant qualifications, experience, and skills.
Although HC has been considerably explored in the private sector as an element
of productivity and financial performance, it has been little discussed in the public
sector as a performance differential. However, some research has shown the relevance
of education in public administration, such as Cardoso and Marenco (2019), who
analyzed the level of education of civil servants in small town halls and its influence
on the performance of the Municipal Human Development Index (MHDI) and the Gini,
an index that measures the concentration of wealth in a given group. The results
reaffirm that educational training contributes to better results, whether in the MHDI or
Gini, and the findings are based on the argument that greater state capacity is linked
to effectiveness in implementing public policies.
Marenco et al. (2017) also found evidence that the capacity of civil servants
contributes to better results in IPTU collection, especially in Brazil's micro and small
municipalities. In this way, the concepts that have already been solidified in the private
sector regarding the importance of education in achieving better results have also
been consolidating in the public sector and supplanting the idea that its importance
is restricted to strategic decision-makers.
According to Khanna et al. (2014), HC contributes to organizational results
when it is held by senior management, especially those who make strategic
decisions or evaluate and monitor them, and not just by employees who carry out
operational activities.
Under Brazilian law, the prerequisites for choosing politicians do not include
educational background or experience, except for "reading and writing". However,
186
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
some studies analyze the importance or influence of these variables in municipal
management, focusing on the executive branch, and testing their influence on IPTU
collection (Avellaneda, 2009; Avellaneda & Gomes, 2015, 2017); per capita spending
(Avellaneda, 2009); financial performance (Gomes et al., 2013; Silva & Sales, 2018;
Gallina et al., 2019); debts, expenses, and taxes (Freier & Thomasius, 2016) and fiscal
indicators (Rocha et al., 2018). However, these studies are limited to the HC of the
manager, in this specific case, the mayors who hold the political and administrative
functions (Avellaneda, 2009; Avellaneda & Gomes, 2017).
Avellaneda and Gomes (2015) investigated whether the size of the population,
education, and experience of the mayor are correlated with municipal performance,
which is represented by the average property tax per municipality, from 2005 to 2007.
The study sampled the 787 municipalities of the state of Minas Gerais in Brazil. The
results showed that the mayor's education and age influence the collection of IPTU.
According to Avellaneda and Gomes (2015), the HC of the manager affects
performance by influencing the strategic direction adopted. For the authors, Human
Capital may be more relevant in larger administrative units due to the demand for
greater management and coordination; managers would be less inclined to make
random decisions and more likely to make decisions focused on technical capacity.
Charges and legal consequences are weighed against administrative determinations
(Avellaneda & Gomes, 2015; Khanna, 2013). The history of research on HC about
performance in local administrations has focused on the capacity of managers as if
they were solely responsible for the good or bad results obtained.
For Demir and Reddick (2012), the functions of the executive and legislative
branches should be complementary. Their research is focused on the dichotomy
between administration and politics in local administrative structures in the USA,
configured by the council-manager regime (political x administrative), unlike Brazilian
local administrations, where the political function is shared between the executive and
the legislature, with only the administrative axis remaining as the central agenda and
function attributed to the executive. The context of their research becomes imperative
because it focuses on the fact that local powers should not be restricted to administrative
or political activities in isolation.
According to Wei (2020), interests in re-election channel time and resources into
strengthening political connections, whether with elected representatives, interest
niches, or electoral bases, and such processes, end up mitigating results or even
precluding more effective policies.
Like the board of directors, that protects the interests of shareholders, the
legislature must protect the interests of society by supervising management acts, by
the duties assigned by the Brazilian Federal Constitution (1988) and the LRF (2000).
From a governance perspective, the checks and balances between the executive
and the legislature are presented as steering, evaluation, and monitoring mechanisms
(Kissler & Heidemann, 2006; Lui, 2017; TCU, 2014). The relationships established
between the executive and the legislature are part of the governance process, and it
is important to realize that these interactions are aimed at balancing power, preventing
187
LuciLene RodRigues de MeLo | oLavo ventuRiM caLdas
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
it from being concentrated in the manager, and striving to achieve the best results
(Lui, 2015).
The involvement of local representatives in administrative issues is more apparent
when they become political issues, as involvement with the administration can give
elected officials greater visibility, contributing to possible re-election (Demir & Reddick,
2012). To imply that management performance depends solely on the head of the
executive branch may be to nullify the effectiveness of monitoring management results.
Taaibosch and Niekerk (2017) argue that to carry out the activities inherent to the
role, councilors need basic education, which favors a broad vision for any activities,
and training to develop technical skills for monitoring administrative activities. According
to the authors, councilors are "guardians" of public finances, and their knowledge is
relevant to the execution of their mandates.
The figure of the legislature is portrayed in the literature in two ways: a legislature
that fails to fulfill its monitoring and oversight role, permeated by party-political interests
that are detrimental to the state's fiscal control (Santiso, 2005), and a legislature that
is a necessary governance structure. It inhibits the executive's discretion over the
budget because it represents a checks and balances mechanism in a democratic
state of law and can avoid electoral bargaining (Lui, 2017; Santiso, 2005; TCU, 2014).
Fiscal management
Federalism gave rise to sub-national units, which are the territorial, political,
and administrative subdivisions of sub-units of a system of government, ruled by
Article 1 of the 1988 Federal Constitution. The justifications for political-administrative
decentralization lie in proximity to the most urgent needs of the population and
the possibility of greater control by citizens, as they are closer to their political
representatives (Dantas et al., 2019; Suzart et al., 2018).
Institutional Federalism gave rise to Fiscal Federalism, defined as the sharing
of tax competencies and obligations about public policies (Dantas et al., 2019).
Municipal entities were assigned exclusive and shared obligations; however, the fiscal
management of these subnational units has been compromised by scarce resources
(Suzart et al., 2018).
Complementary Law No. 101 of 2000 was enacted to establish guidelines for
greater control of finances in the three branches of government. In this way, the
fiscal management of municipalities is evaluated from the perspective of this law,
and although this is attributed to the mayor, the LRF (2000) establishes in its Article
59 that the legislative power is responsible, directly or with the help of external and
internal control bodies, for monitoring the rules laid down.
For proper fiscal control, this law established fiscal limits and rules that help
supervisory bodies monitor management. In addition to the dictates of this law, other
indices have been constructed to ascertain the efficiency of administrations, such as
the Firjan index, which was created based on the guidelines and liabilities imposed
by the LRF (2000).
188
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
Given the above, recent research has focused on the ability to generate revenue
and control expenditure, which could be explained by the profile of the local manager,
with evidence that the level of formal education of municipal managers and/or experience
is positively correlated with performance indicators (Avellaneda, 2009; Avellaneda &
Gomes, 2015; Gallina et al., 2019; Gomes et al., 2013; Freier & Thomasius, 2016;
Rocha et al., 2018). Based on these studies, the first hypothesis was formulated:
H1: The level of education of mayors is positively correlated with
Fiscal Performance.
Investments in education and experiences acquired throughout life, whether
in the private or public environment, are components that enable the formation of
knowledge and skills, the real essence of HC (Nguyen et al., 2017). In this sense,
these measures allow us to infer the likely benefits, while it is not possible to identify
the quality or quantity of knowledge and skills that permeate each individual.
In the legislative sphere, the knowledge acquired can be applied to the monitoring,
control, and inspection of finances; it can generate greater caution on the part of the
mayor when making decisions and conducting administration.
In the context of the importance of education, Baldissera et al. (2020) found
evidence that a population's level of education can exert greater pressure on public
managers, contributing to the transparency of management acts. In this understanding,
it is assumed that the more a manager is supervised, especially by members with
a higher level of knowledge, the greater the chances of establishing management
control, which can generate better results.
Important research in the private sector shows that the level of education of
the board of directors affects the performance of the administration (Nguyen et al.,
2017; Valenti & Horner, 2020; Khanna et al., 2014), which gives rise to assumptions
that the HC of municipal councils can generate better fiscal indicators. This line of
interpretation motivated the second hypothesis:
H2: The level of education of councilors is positively correlated with Fiscal
Performance.
Although responsibility for the budget and fiscal discipline is attributed to the
executive, the literature disseminates that the concentration of power in the executive
creates opportunities for corruption and mitigates fiscal results, so the legislature
presents itself as the link of checks and balances and should be responsible for
overseeing finances (Lui, 2017; Santiso, 2005; Taaibosch & Niekerk, 2017).
One of the components of HC is experience, measured through years of activity
in private or public positions (Khanna et al., 2013; Freier & Thomasius, 2016; Gomes
et al., 2013; Valenti & Horner, 2020) and/or age (Avellaneda & Gomes, 2015). In the
studies by Avellaneda and Gomes (2015), age was used as a proxy for experience
and showed significance in the ability to collect IPTU, which was replicated in this
research. For the authors, age can be a component that adds skills acquired over
time through professional experience. This line of interpretation motivated the third
and fourth hypotheses:
H3: Municipalities managed by older mayors have better Fiscal Performance.
189
LuciLene RodRigues de MeLo | oLavo ventuRiM caLdas
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
H4: Municipalities supervised by older councilors have better Fiscal
Performance.
For Valenti and Horner (2020) and Khanna et al. (2013), the experience of the
board is seen as a factor of competitiveness and is favorable to better financial results.
For the authors, the directors' experience in related activities in other companies
generates a multifaceted view of organizational monitoring. However, for local councils
that don't have professional selection based on experience, the accumulation of
skills can influence management monitoring, generating better indicators. As related
experiences, we suggest that holding positions in public administration, as well
as in elected office, can improve management and oversight capacity. This line of
interpretation motivated the fifth and sixth hypotheses:
H5: Municipalities managed by mayors with previous experience in public
office have better Fiscal Performance.
H6: Municipalities supervised by councilors with previous experience in
public office have better Fiscal Performance.
Research Methodology
Sample data
To achieve the proposed objective of verifying whether the HC of mayors and
councilors influences fiscal performance, the 2012 and 2016 elections were selected
for data collection. The sample consisted of the 5,570 municipalities of the Federative
Republic of Brazil, excluding the Federal District and the Territory of Fernando de
Noronha due to their political and administrative peculiarities. This study was based
on secondary data and is characterized as descriptive, quantitative, and longitudinal.
The information on the elected candidates was collected from the Superior
Electoral Court (TSE), the accounting data from the Brazilian Public Sector Accounting
and Fiscal Information System (SICONFI), for the periods 2013 to 2015 and 2017 to
2019. The FIRJAN index was obtained from the website of the Federation of Industries
of the State of Rio de Janeiro. The GDP information was taken from the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and the media data was collected from
the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCTI).
Election years 2016 and 2020 were excluded from the sample due to evidence
pointed out by Cavalcante (2016) that in election years there is evidence of lower
revenue and higher investment spending, prioritizing spending that may be more
noticeable to the electorate. In addition, the year 2020 adds the impacts of the Covid-19
pandemic as an exclusion factor.
Description of the variables
The first dependent variable is the Fiscal Autonomy Index (IAF). This indicator
is an adaptation of the Financial Performance Management Index first proposed by
Gomes et al. (2013) and then re-adapted by Gallina et al. (2019). The indicator shows
the capacity of local administrations to meet the total expenditure generated.
190
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
For a broader look at fiscal performance, the Firjan Fiscal Management Index
(IFGF) was included, which indicates the performance of municipalities in four areas:
autonomy, personnel expenditure, investment, and liquidity.
The IFGF index uses data from 5,568 Brazilian municipalities, based on official
fiscal information sent by the municipalities to the National Treasury Secretariat (STN).
The purpose of the index is to provide comparative information on fiscal efficiency in
all Brazilian municipalities. One limitation is the lack of data for the 2019 financial year.
For the HC of mayors and councilors, three proxies were defined: completed higher
education, experience in public service (municipal, state, or federal) or holding elected
office, and age. Experience in elected office was defined based on the declaration
of occupation to the TSE, considering the positions of deputy, senator, mayor, and
councilor, as well as data on re-election for mayors and councilors collected from
the TSE, IBGE, and 2008 elections. The availability of data on the Gross Domestic
Product, calculated by the IBGE, was limited, as information on this variable was only
released up to the 2018 financial year, which was deflated using the 2010 financial
year as a reference. For all annual data, we calculated the average from 2013 to 2015
and 2017 to 2019.
Table 1 - Variables Description
Dependents Code Description Source
IAF IAF
Total revenue minus
transfers divided
by committed
expenditure.
Gomes et al. (2013);
State Industries
Federation of Rio de
Janeiro (Firjan).
IFGF IFGF
Arithmetic average:
autonomy, personnel
expenses, liquidity, and
investments.
IFGF autonomy IFGF_aut
Personalised IFGF IFGF_pess
IFGF liquidity IFGF_liq
IFGF investment IFGF_invest
Independents Code Description Source
Scholars
edu_pref
Dummy, being 1 for
higher level and 0
otherwise.
Avellaneda (2009);
Avellaneda and Gomes
(2015); Avellaneda and
Gomes (2017); Freier
and Thomasius (2016)
edu_vere
Councilors proportion
with complete high
education by the
municipality
191
LuciLene RodRigues de MeLo | oLavo ventuRiM caLdas
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
Experience
exp_adm_pref
Dummy, being 1 for
experience in public
administration and 0
otherwise
Freier and Thomasius
(2016); Valenti and
Horner (2020); Rocha
et al. (2018); Nguyen
et al. (2017).
exp_adm_vere
Councilors proportion
with experience in
public administration
by municipality
exp_id_pref
Natural logarithm of
mayors' age
Avellaneda and Gomes
(2015).
exp_id_vere
Average natural
logarithm of age
Average natural
logarithm of age of the
Chamber of Deputies
Control Code Description Source
GDP per capita pib_per
The total wealth
generated in year
t divided by the
population
Avellaneda and Gomes
(2015;2017); Gomes et
al. (2013).
Gender
gen_pref
Dummy, being 1 for
male and 0 for female
Rocha et al. (2018).
gen_vere
Proportion among
councilors males about
total
Electoral competition
cp_pref
The effective number
of parties
Golosov (2010).
cp_vere
Medias
Broadcasting
Numbers of radios by
municipalities
(Ciarelli & Avila, 2019;
Pieranti, 2008; Pieranti
& Martins, 2007).
Tv station
Numbers of
TV stations by
municipalities
Source: elaborated by author 2021.
The effective number of parties was calculated from an evolving formula by
Golosoy (2010):
In which:
Np: effective number of parties;
S
2
: the largest component in the proportion of party votes division;
1
X: components of the proportion of party votes division;
S
i
: components or other components in the party votes division;
192
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
For example:
Election with a total of 60,000 nominal votes, including 51% in party A, 35% in
party B, and 14% in party C, we will have:
The example tends to demonstrate the simplicity of the Golosov formula (2010),
demystifying its complexity and propitiating its application through an intuitive form.
The variable electoral competition considered roll-call votes per party according to the
TSE data. The Golosov mensuration aims to intuitively measure the real competition
through the effective number of parties (Np). The higher the index is, the greater the
political competition is, which can contribute to a diversified opposition and possible
incentives for better fiscal results.
Econometric Model
To verify the proposed objective, the influence of the human capital (education
and experience) of mayors and councilors on fiscal performance indicators, the model
adopted was a multiple linear regression (MQO). The data was processed in an Excel
spreadsheet and then in Stata® software.
Regression:
Being:
DF- Fiscal Performance =
Β0: Constant
: Independent variables
control variables for municipality i;
: represents the random error term.
To answer the objective of this research, the regression coefficients β1, β2, and
β3 are associated, respectively, with hypotheses H1, H3, and H5, while β4, β5, and
β6 are associated with hypotheses H2, H4, and H6.
For a better understanding, sub-hypotheses were created, considering that each
independent variable tests six dependent variables, components of Fiscal Performance.
See the table below.
193
LuciLene RodRigues de MeLo | oLavo ventuRiM caLdas
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
Table 2 - Hypothesis Control
Hypotheses/Variables IAF IFGF IFGF_aut IFGF_pess IFGF_liq IFGF_invest
Hypothesis 1
H1a + H1b + H1c + H1d + H1e + H1f +
Hypothesis 2
H2a + H2b + H2c + H2d + H2e + H2f +
Hypothesis 3
H3a + H3b + H3c + H3d + H3e + H3f +
Hypothesis 4
H4a + H4b + H4c + H4d + H4e + H4f +
Hypothesis 5
H5a + H5b + H5c + H5d + H5e + H5f +
Hypothesis 6
H6a + H6b + H6c + H6d + H6e + H6f +
Source: Prepared by the author 2021.
Res pulled
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show the mean of the variables, standard
deviation (SD), maximum, minimum, and percentiles (p25, p50, p75) of the sample
composition. The education of mayors was relatively homogeneous, with more than
50 percent of Brazilian mayors having completed higher education.
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics
Variables Average Standard deviation Min. p25 p50 p75 Max. Obs.
IAF 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.19 0.36 11050
IFGF_general 0.44 0.19 0.01 0.29 0.43 0.58 1 11019
IFGF_aut 0.37 0.39 0 0 0.23 0.74 1 11019
IFGF_pess 0.41 0.29 0 0.17 0.38 0.61 1 11019
IFGF_liq 0.50 0.30 0 0.27 0.52 0.70 1 11019
IFGF_invest 0.48 0.23 0 0.30 0.45 0.64 1 11019
edu_pref 0.51 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 11136
exp_id_pref 48,5 10,4 21 41 48 55 89 11136
exp_adm_pref 0.39 0.49 0 0 0.00 1.00 1 11136
edu_vere 0.23 0.17 0 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.91 11136
exp_id_vere 43,7 3.75 29 41 43 46 56 11136
exp_adm_vere 0.47 0.17 0 0.33 0.44 0.56 1 11136
gen_pref_masc 0.88 0.32 0 1 1 1 1 11136
gen_vere_msc 0.86 0.11 0.33 0.78 0.89 0.93 1 11136
ln_pib 9.27 0.69 7.78 8.67 9.24 9.74 13.13 11136
broadcasting 0.38 0.86 0 0 0 1 14 11136
broadcaster_tv 1.11 1.64 0 0 0 2 18 11136
194
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
cppref 1.94 0.49 0 1.70 1.88 2.06 6.82 11136
cpvere 6.97 3.49 1.09 4.30 6.35 8.93 27.24 11136
Source: Elaborated by the author 2021. Note: description of variables in Table 1.
On average, the Fiscal Autonomy Index of Brazilian municipalities is 13%, and
the maximum is 36%; this data shows that a large part of municipal revenue comes
from transfers, confirming a situation of limited tax collection capacity, even in the
largest municipalities.
An average of 23% of councilors have a university degree, a low percentage
considering the data for mayors. According to Avellaneda and Gomes (2015), the
level of education of mayors is associated with a broad vision of public administration
and a likelihood of choices based on technical capacity. On the other hand, the level
of education of councilors can be an important element when it comes to interacting
with and challenging the mayor's decisions.
In addition to education, we have experience as a component of human capital.
Based on the sample, it is estimated that 47 percent of municipal councils are made
up of representatives with experience in public administration, either as a civil servant
or in elected office.
Results and Discussions
Table 4 shows the results of the regression analyzing the influence of the CH of
mayors and councilors on fiscal performance in Brazil's 5,568 municipalities from 2013
to 2015 and 2017 to 2019. Six regressions evaluate the IAF and all the dimensions of
the FIRJAN Index using the same independent variables. Multiple linear regression
was defined according to the model below.
Regression:
Given the nature of the data, linear regression with robust effects was applied
to correct for heteroscedasticity, justified by the number of periods surveyed. The IAF
variable was winsorized at 5% due to outliers.
Linearity between the variables was verified using the Spearman test, and the
indication of multicollinearity was ruled out using the VIF (variance inflation factor)
test. Fávero, Belfiore, Takamatsu, and Suzart (2014) argue that a VIF greater than 5
already indicates multicollinearity.
The proposed sample has a VIF of 1.17 for all the models. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test showed that the residuals were normal, but we can invoke Pierre Simon
Laplace's Central Limit Theorem, which states that "the sampling distribution of any
mean becomes normal as the sample size increases" (Norean, Veaux & Velleman,
2011, p. 279).
195
LuciLene RodRigues de MeLo | oLavo ventuRiM caLdas
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
The F-test was significant, indicating that the proposed models are capable of
explaining the variation in the explained variables.
Table 4 - Multiple Linear Regression
Variables
IAF IFGF general IFGF_aut IFGF_pess IFGF_liq IFGF_invest
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
edu_pref 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.035*** 0.022*** 0.012** -0.000
0.001 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.004
exp_id_pref 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
exp_adm_pref 0.004*** 0.018*** -0.001 0.031*** -0.003 0.046***
0.001 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004
edu_vere 0.080*** 0.052*** 0.280*** 0.014 -0.003 -0.081***
0.005 0.011 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.015
exp_id_vere 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.002** 0.000 -0.003***
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.015
exp_adm_vere -0.021*** -0.077*** -0.151*** -0.096*** 0.012 -0.074***
0.004 0.009 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.012
gen_pref_masc 0.007*** 0.019*** 0.015* 0.037*** 0.004 0.022***
0.002 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.007
gen_vere_masc 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.171*** 0.021 0.017 -0.002
0.006 0.014 0.023 0.026 0.028 0.020
ln_pib_per 0.063*** 0.157*** 0.361*** 0.143*** 0.100*** 0.025***
0.001 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004
broadcasting 0.024*** 0.012*** 0.029*** 0.025*** -0.001 -0.005
0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003
broadcasters_tv 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.002 0.004* 0.004***
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
cppref 0.003** -0.018*** 0.001 -0.027*** 0.001 -0.046***
0.001 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
cpvere 0.002*** -0.004*** 0.005*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.009***
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
cons -0.688*** -1.111*** -3.656*** -0.887*** -0.518*** 0.611***
0.016 0.032 0.058 0.059 0.061 0.046
Observations 11.050 11.019 11.019 11.019 11.019 11.019
Statistics F 505,02 372,3 842,86 113,83 40,77 60,04
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.535 0.406 0.622 0.165 0.064 0.076
Test VIF 1,17 1,17 1,17 1,17 1,17 1,17
Source: elaborated by the author 2021. In which: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, signicant coef-
cients at levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Note: description of variables in Table 1.
196
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
Based on the regressions, it can be inferred that the mayor's education is related
to all the dependent variables, except IFGF investment, thus meeting H1a, H1b, H1c,
H1d, and H1e. The highest coefficient was for the autonomy IFGF (β=0.035, α at 1%),
showing that municipalities managed by mayors with higher education generate 3.5%
more resources to support themselves.
The findings are in line with the results of Gallina et al. (2019), in which the
capacity to generate revenue was positively correlated, indicating that the higher the
mayor's level of education, the greater the municipality's revenue-raising capacity.
The results diverge from the findings of Freier and Thomasius (2016), who found
no positive relationship between the education of German mayors and fiscal results
(expenditure, debt, and taxes).
In the studies by Avellaneda and Gomes (2017), which sampled the 827
municipalities of Minas Gerais, the mayor's education also did not explain the
performance of the collection of Urban Land Tax. However, Rocha et al. (2018) found
significant results, showing that Brazilian mayors with a higher level of education
tend to spend less on current and personnel expenses, a fact that can be seen in
the regression of the personal IFGF with a positive coefficient of 2.2% (α at 1%) and
liquidity IFGF 1.2% (α at 5%), indicating that municipalities where mayors with higher
education were elected have a lower budget commitment to payroll and more control
over leftovers to pay.
About Hypothesis 2, the results show positive and statistically significant evidence
at 1% that there is a correlation between the level of education of councilors about
the IAF (β=0.080; H2a), general IFGF (β =0.052; H2b) and autonomy IFGF (β=0.280,
H2c). We rejected sub-hypotheses H2d, H2e, and H2f, linked to personal IFGF, liquidity
IFGF and investment IFGF, respectively. In a more critical analysis, we can see that the
education of councilors seems to be more influential in municipal autonomy, given that
among the four components of the IFGF, only autonomy showed a high explanatory
coefficient. This result may indicate that education can mitigate the inclinations put
forward by Santiso (2005) that the legislature is more prone to lower taxes.
However, the effects of monitoring on fiscal results are difficult to measure (Santiso,
2015). According to Taaibosch and Niekerk (2017), a legislature with low levels of
knowledge tends to stick to incipient discussions without realizing the more complex
demands inherent in the monitoring function. However, given the results, we can
suggest that the educational level of councilors may favor greater involvement with
administration.
The results show, however, that the level of education has a negative influence
on the investment IFGF with a coefficient of -0.081 at a 1% significance level. The
correlation with previous studies is hampered by the scarcity of studies relating the
effectiveness of management oversight and monitoring to the HC of councilors.
However, the investment index is a tortuous indicator to evaluate, as the executive
has discretion over the allocation of resources. This is where political interest comes
in, or what could be called agency conflicts, from the point of view of Jensen and
Meckling's theory (1976).
197
LuciLene RodRigues de MeLo | oLavo ventuRiM caLdas
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
In addition to higher-level knowledge, the capacity developed, and skills learned
over time through professional experience are important (Avellaneda, 2009). Due to
the possibility of various accumulative experiences over time, the mayors' age proxy
shows a positive coefficient about the IAF (β=0.000; α at 1%; H3a) and IFGF autonomy
(β=0.001; α at 1%; H3c). Although the coefficients are not very representative, the
relationship between age and tax collection performance can be compared to the
findings of Avellaneda and Gomes (2015), who found evidence that experience gained
over time can influence tax collection performance.
For the personnel and investment IFGFs, the correlation was negative, around
-0.001 at 99% confidence, indicating that although older mayors are prone to higher
revenue, they spend more on personnel and invest less. Despite this, older mayors
control the liquidity IFGF by around 0.1% at 99% confidence. Given the results, the
following sub-hypotheses are rejected: H3d and H3f.
Hypothesis 4, which verifies the correlation between the age of councilors and
fiscal performance, was rejected for IFGF liquidity and investment and was accepted for
IAF (β=0.003; α at 1%; H4a), IFGF general (β=0.002; α at 1%; H4b), IFGF autonomy
(β=0.009; α at 1%; H4c), and IFGF personal (β=0.002; α at 5%; H4d). The coefficients
show little significance. However, they indicate that municipalities where councilors
have a higher average age, and consequently more experience in the public or private
sector, can enable better monitoring of management in terms of the fiscal management
indices presented.
Occupation of public administration or elective positions was a second parameter
used to measure the level of experience of mayors and councilors. About mayors,
the results showed a positive correlation between this variable and the IAF (β=0.004;
α at 1%; H5a), general IFGF (β=0.018; α at 1%; H5b), personal IFGF (β=0.031; α
at 1%; H5d), and investment IFGF (β=0.046; α at 1%; H5f). The findings indicate
that municipalities managed by mayors with previous experience control personnel
expenditure better by 3.1 percent. This result is similar to that found by Rocha et al.
(2018), when they showed that more experienced mayors spend less on personnel.
Previous experience as mayor in the studies by Freier and Thomasius (2015)
was positively correlated with lower debt and local taxes, a controversial fact about the
findings of this study, since the IFGF autonomy and liquidity did not show a significant
relationship, but we can consider that the proxy for experience was not limited to re-
election and that the formation of the dependent variables is only similWar in nature.
Given this evidence, we reject H5c and H5e.
About the previous experience of councilors, we rejected H6 in all its sub-items,
as the results were negatively correlated with most of the proposed indicators and not
significant about the liquidity IFGF. This shows that municipalities with more experienced
councilors do not have the best fiscal indicators. Comparisons are frustrated by the
lack of previous studies. However, in the private environment, the board of directors
also assumes the functions of controlling and monitoring management. Although they
are two different atmospheres, public and private, the functions are not opposed,
considering the governance mechanisms. In this way, the studies by Khanna et al.
(2014) provide evidence that the years of experience of board members in senior
198
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
executive positions are capable of improving the company's financial performance, a
result that is the opposite of that found in this study about the local legislature.
The result is intriguing, but it may suggest that the experience generates greater
involvement with the administration and that this is harmful to fiscal management.
This finding is compatible with the literature, which states that the legislative branch is
harmful to fiscal balance. According to Santiso (2005), giving the legislature too many
powers is detrimental to public accounts and can lead to public deficits, indebtedness,
excessive spending, and under-taxation.
As for the control variables, the variation in GDP per capita corroborates the
better fiscal results. Studies by Gallina et al. (2019) and Silva and Sales (2018) found
a significance between GDP and fiscal performance, also corroborating the findings
of Avellaneda and Gomes (2015) about IPTU, indicating that the greater the income
generation capacity, the better the performance indicators.
The gender of elected politicians showed a positive relationship with the indicators,
with no statistically significant negative relationship. The literature is scant on affirming
that men in public management and monitoring are more efficient, but it would be
biased if we analyzed the proportion of men and women in elected office, since on
average 88% of mayors and 86% of city councils are occupied by men.
As for the media variables, it was found that municipalities with a greater presence
of radio stations and TV stations generally have better Fiscal Autonomy and Firjan
indices. To achieve political objectives, the media is cited in the literature as an electoral
tool and a component of mass influence (Pieranti & Martins, 2007; Pieranti, 2008;
Cohen, Tsfati & Sheafer, 2008; Ciarelli & Avila, 2009). The perceived power of the
mass media is readily apparent in the political environment, and visibility has become
a condition for the prospect of good electoral results (Cohen, 2008). What is suggested
is that the transparency of the actions and facts of the administration can undermine
votes when analyzing the administration of the mayor. As far as the legislature is
concerned, with greater political tension exposed on radio and TV, councilors would
be more inclined to act in the administration to protect their electoral interests (Demir
& Reddick, 2012).
Thus, in a polarised or multipolarised political environment, the exposure of
management performance can generate consequences not so desired by political
representatives, avoiding disjointed or technically unsound decisions; thus, wear and
tear in the media is avoided by undermining votes or perpetuation in power, which can
contribute to better fiscal condition indicators, in line with the findings of this research.
In addition to the media and the profile of mayors and councilors, other factors
certainly influence the fiscal performance of municipalities. The high level of electoral
competition can encourage mayors to demonstrate their best performance to society
as a means of outdoing their opponents (Baldissera et al., 2020; Rocha et al.,
2018). According to Silva (2013), electoral competition is the search for votes by
candidates or parties.
In administrative contexts other than the one adopted in Brazil, such as the
sample analyzed by Wei (2020) in the USA, administrative structures in which there
is a manager-council figure are generally more efficient from a fiscal point of view,
199
LuciLene RodRigues de MeLo | oLavo ventuRiM caLdas
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
indicating that political interests probably have a negative influence on the results of
local administrations.
In Brazil, we have another bias: multi-party politics, which can often lead to conflicts
of interest. The results found that political competition for the position of mayor was
negatively correlated with overall IFGF, personnel, and investment, indicating that
increased competition does not generate better indicators in general. For the position
of councilor, it was negative for general IFGF (β=-0.004; α=1%), personnel (β=-0.009;
α=1%), liquidity (β=-0.005; α=1%) and investment (β=-0.009; α=1%). However, the
result of competition about the IAF was positive and significant, with a coefficient of
0.003 at 95% confidence for mayors and 0.002 at 99% for councilors, indicating that
municipalities with greater competition have a greater capacity to honor their expenses,
even if the reflection is not very representative.
Final Considerations
This research aimed to verify the influence of the HC of mayors and councilors
on fiscal performance. The results showed that the Human Capital of mayors and
councilors influences most of the components of fiscal performance, but the experience
of councilors is not beneficial for fiscal management.
The findings could contribute to new lines of study that focus on the sharing
of competencies between the executive and the legislature, as well as the latter's
accountability for fiscal results, bearing in mind its competencies as an instrument of
governance and fiscal management.
Unfortunately, not all HC characteristics are easily estimated, such as experience
and skill, especially when the parameter has to be assigned on a larger scale of data.
Although there is a diversity of publications on the theory of HC as a premise for
competitiveness, performance, and innovation, it was found that there is little research
focusing on the knowledge, skill, and experience of local legislative power.
The research was limited to the number of elections in 2012 and 2016. Future
research could extend the analysis to a larger number and thus capture the variability
of performance results. As a suggestion, we recommend more specific studies by
state, for example, to better analyze the profile of councilors and mayors. In addition,
it would be important to try to measure the knowledge, skills, and experience of
elected representatives in a more specific way, using a smaller sample that would
make it possible to use questionnaires, since the TSE data is general and specific.
The research has contributed to a new line of analysis of the involvement of councilors
in the fiscal results of municipalities.
References
Askim, J. (2009). The Demand Side of Performance Measurement: Explaining Council's
'Utilization of Performance Information in Policymaking. International Public
Management Journal, 12(1), 24-47.
200
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
Avellaneda, C. N. (2009). Municipal Performance: Does Mayoral Quality Matter?
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(2), 285-312.
Avellaneda, C. N., & Gomes, R. C. (2015). Is Small Beautiful? Testing the Direct
and Nonlinear Effects of Size on Municipal Performance. Public Administration
Review, 75(1), 137-49.
Avellaneda, C. N., & Gomes, R. C. (2017). Mayoral quality and municipal performance
in Brazilian local governments. Organizações & Sociedade, 24(83), 555-79.
Baldissera, J. F., Dall’Asta, D., Casagrande, L. F., & Oliveira, Abdinardo M. B. (2020).
Influência dos aspectos socioeconômicos, financeiro-orçamentários e políticos-
eleitorais na transparência dos governos locais. Revista de Administração Pública,
54(2), 340-59.
Becker, G. S. (1994). Human capital revisited. In Human Capital: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education (3a, pp. 15-28). The
University of Chicago press.
Cardoso, A. L. R., & Marenco, A. (2019). Qualidade Burocrática e Performance Estatal:
desvendando a caixa preta do município. Administração Pública e Gestão Social,
4(11), 1-21.
Cardoso, G., & Rodrigues, E. (2023). Management Public Accounting: An Analysis
of Cost Information in the Light of Public Managers’ Perception. Brazilian
Business Review.
Cavalcante, P. (2016). Desempenho fiscal e eleições no Brasil: uma análise comparada
dos governos municipais. Revista de Administração Pública, 50(2), 307-30.
Ciarelli, G., & Ávila, M. (2009). A influência da mídia e da heurística da disponibilidade
na percepção da realidade: um estudo experimental. Revista de Administração
Pública, 43(3), 541-62.
Cohen, J., Tsfati, Y., & Sheafer, T. (2008). The Influence of Presumed Media Influence
in Politics: Do Politicians’ Perceptions of Media Power Matter?. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 72(2), 331-44.
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1998. (1998). Brasília.
201
LuciLene RodRigues de MeLo | oLavo ventuRiM caLdas
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
Dantas, A. F., Jr., Diniz, J. A., & Lima, S. C. (2019). A Influência Do Federalismo Fiscal
Sobre o Estresse Fiscal dos Municípios Brasileiros. Advances in Scientific &
Applied Accounting, 12(3), 62-78.
Demir, T., & Reddick, C. G. (2012). Understanding Shared Roles in Policy and
Administration: An Empirical Study of Council-Manager Relations. Public
Administration Review, 72(4), 526-35.
Fávero, L. P., Belfiore, P., Takamatsu, R. T., & Suzart, J. Métodos quantitativos com
stata: procedimentos, rotinas e análise de resultados. 1. ed. Rio de Janeiro:
Elsevier, 2014.
Freier, R., & Thomasius, S. (2016). Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does
it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany. Int Tax Public Finance,
23, 875-910.
Gallina, A. S., Risden, A. E. S., Jr., & Ferreira, J. C. (2019). Teoria dos recursos
cognitivos e Capital Humano: A influência do grau de instrução formal na
gestão dos municípios da região sul do Brasil. Revista Catarinense Da Ciência
Contábil, 18, E2828.
Gao, J. (2015). Performance Measurement and Management in the Public Sector:
Some Lessons from Research Evidence. Public Administration & Development,
35(2), 86-96.
Golosov, G. (2010). The effective number of parties: a new approach. Party Politics,
6(2), 171-92.
Gomes, R. C., Alfinito, S., & Albuquerque, P. H. M. (2013). Analyzing local government
financial performance: evidence from Brazilian municipalities 2005-2008. Revista
de Administração Contemporânea, 17(6), 704-19.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency Costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-60.
Khanna, P., Jones, C. D., & Boivie, S. (2014). Director Human Capital, Information
Processing Demands, and Board Effectiveness. Journal of Management,
40(2), 557-85.
202
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
Kissler, L., & Heidemann, F. G. (2006). Governança pública: novo modelo regulatório
para as relações entre Estado, mercado e sociedade. Revista de Administração
Pública, 40(3), 479-99.
Lui, L. T. P. (2017). Institutions do matter: Exploring the problem of governance in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region from the perspective of executive-
legislative relations. Asian Education and Development Studies, 6(1), 72-82.
Marenco, A., Strohschoen, M. T. B., & Joner, W. (2017). Capacidade estatal, burocracia
e tributação nos municípios brasileiros. Revista de Sociologia e Política,
25(64), 3-21.
Medeiros, J., & Demo, G. (2020). Attributes of a Relationship Management Model for
the Public Sector (CiRS Exec). Brazilian Business Review, 18(1), 101-17.
Mincer, J. (1958). Investment in human capital and personal income distribution.
Journal of Political Economy, 66(4), 281-302.
Nguyen, T., Nguyen, A., Locke, S., Reddy, K., & Murray, L. (2017). Does the human
capital of board directors add value to firms? Evidence from an Asian market.
Cogent Economics & Finance, 5(1), 1385-439.
Norean, N. R., Veaux, R. D., & Velleman, P. F. (2011). Estatística aplicada [recurso
eletrônico]. Porto Alegre, Bookman.
Pieranti, O. P. (2008). A radiodifusão e os coronéis da mídia: uma discussão conceitual
acerca do ‘coronelismo eletrônico. ECO-POS, 11(1), 128-45.
Pieranti, O. P., & Martins, P. E. M. (2007). A radiodifusão como um negócio: um olhar
sobre a gestação do código brasileiro de telecomunicações. Revista de Economía
Política de las Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicación Online, 9(1).
Rocha, F., Orellano, V. I. F., & Bugarin, K. (2018). Eleito em disputa acirrada:
características do prefeito e finanças públicas locais. Economia, 19(2), 149-63.
Santiso, C. (2005). Budget Institutions and Fiscal Responsibility: Parliaments and the
Political Economy of the Budget Process. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute
Working Paper No. 37253.
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in Human Capital. American Economic Review, 51(1), 1.
203
Municipal Fiscal perForMance: Does the huMan capital Make a DiFFerence?
Gestão & Conexões (ManageMent and ConneCtions Journal). Vitória (Es), Vol. 13, n. 3, ago./noV. 2024.
Silva, G. P. da. (2013). Uma avaliação empírica da competição eleitoral para a Câmara
Federal no Brasil. Opinião Pública, 19(2), 403-29.
Silva, J. E., & Sales, M. A, F.. (2018). A Influência do Grau de Instrução do Gestor
Público no Desempenho Financeiro dos Municípios. USP International Conference
in Accounting, 17.
Suzart, J. A. S., Zuccolotto, R., & Rocha, D. G. R. (2018). Federalismo Fiscal e as
Transferências Intergovernamentais: Um Estudo Exploratório Com es Municípios
Brasileiros. Advances in Scientific & Applied Accounting, 11(1), 127-45.
Taaibosch, T. A., & Niekerk, V. T. (2017). Capacity Building Challenges of Municipal
Councillors in the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality in the Free State Province.
Central University of Technology, Free State.
Travaglia, K. R., & De Sá, L. F. V. N. (2017). Fortalecimento da governança: uma
agenda contemporânea para o setor público brasileiro. Revista Controle - Doutrina
e Artigos, 15(1), 22-53.
Tribunal de Contas da União [TCU]. (2014). Governança Pública: referencial básico
de governança aplicável a órgãos e entidades da administração pública e ações
indutoras de melhoria / Tribunal de Contas da União”. Brasília: TCU, Secretaria
de Planejamento, Governança e Gestão, 2014.
Valenti, A., & Horner, S. (2020). The Human Capital of Boards of Directors and
Innovation: An Empirical Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry. International
Journal of Innovation Management, 24(6).
Viana, G., & Lima, J. F.. Capital Humano e crescimento econômico. Interações,
11(2), 137-48.
Wei, W. (2020). Municipal Structure Matters: Evidence from Government Fiscal
Performance. Public Administration Review, 72, 526-35.
