The
envy and the justice in the well-ordered society[1]
A inveja e a justiça na sociedade bem-ordenada
Alexsandra
Andrade Santana
alexsandraandrades@hotmail.com
UFS – Universidade Federal de Sergipe.
Recebido: 05/11/2023
Received: 05/11/2023
Aprovado: 08/11/2023
Approved: 08/11/2023
Publicado: 29/12/2023
Published: 29/12/2023
ABSTRACT
John Rawls, in
developing his theory of justice as fairness, devoted efforts to demonstrating
that his political conception of justice is intrinsically stable by creating
the conditions, so that “excusable general envy” does not proliferate in a
well-ordered, just and unequal society. That
solution was contested by Jean-Pierre Dupuy, according to whom Rawls would have
been naïve in believing that the solution of the “problem of justice” would
also solve the “problem of envy”. This paper aims at investigating the
relevance of such observations, considering whether or not the solution to the
“problem of justice” is also an effective way of dealing with the “problem of
envy”. The thesis to be defended is that, despite Rawls's efforts, the risks
arising from envy are only partially avoided, since the envy that can
destabilize the political conception of justice is not limited to “excusable
general envy”.
Keywords: envy, social
stability, inequality, John Rawls, Jean-Pierre Dupuy.
RESUMO
John Rawls, ao desenvolver sua teoria da justiça como equidade, dedicou esforços a demonstrar que a sua concepção política de justiça é intrinsecamente estável ao criar as condições para que a “inveja geral desculpável” não se prolifere na sociedade bem-ordenada, justa e desigual. Tal solução foi contestada por Jean-Pierre Dupuy, segundo o qual Rawls teria sido ingênuo ao acreditar que a solução do “problema da justiça” seria capaz de resolver também o “problema da inveja”. O presente trabalho visa investigar a pertinência de tais observações a partir da forma como a solução do “problema da justiça” é capaz, ou não, de lidar com o “problema da inveja”. A tese a ser defendida é a de que, apesar dos esforços de Rawls, os riscos advindos da inveja são apenas parcialmente evitados, uma vez que a inveja que pode desestabilizar a concepção política de justiça não se limita à “inveja geral desculpável”.
Palavras-chave: inveja, estabilidade social, desigualdade, John Rawls, Jean-Pierre Dupuy.
Introduction
Envy arises
fundamentally from the intersection of gazes in a modern society deeply divided
by social and economic inequalities, but which defends the idea that human
beings are free and equal by nature. It is in this context that the
well-ordered society proposed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice is
inserted: it is undoubtedly a modern society that seeks to reconcile the
demands of liberty and equality, but which sanctions just inequalities through
the adoption of the “principle of difference”.
Rawls
devoted his efforts to demonstrating that his political conception of justice
is inherently stable by creating the conditions for envy not to proliferate in
a well-ordered, just, and unequal society. In his account, the dangers of envy
are observed in both parts of the argument in favor of the conception of
justice as fairness, both in the original position, where its presence would
hinder the process of rational choice, and in the well-ordered society, where
envy can be a factor of social instability.
Despite the
centrality of the “problem of envy”, the issue appears little in the secondary
literature on Rawlsian thought, and when it does, it is generally treated as a
minor element in his argument. I can think of two possible reasons for this.
The first concerns the fact that the stability test, into which the argument
about the “problem of envy” is inserted, has received little attention from
commentators until Rawls takes it up again in Political Liberalism,
where he argues that there is a serious flaw in Part III of Theory:
there justice as fairness is treated as a “comprehensive doctrine”, and this
would be incompatible with the “fact of reasonable pluralism” of the liberal
democratic society for which his philosophy is intended, and would threaten its
stability.[2] The second reason is that, despite the
revisions, Rawls (2003, [JER, §55.1], p. 262-263) maintained all the main
points of his argument on envy, warning his readers that the inclusion of new
elements on moral psychology and the good of society would only be
supplementary to what had already been presented in Theory. Thus, there
was no need to return to the “problem of envy” in his later works.
The
continuing importance of the “problem of envy” can also be seen in Justice
as Fairness: A Restatement, in which Rawls (2003, [JER, §25.5], p. 125)
reaffirms what he said in Theory (1997, [JER, §80], p. 590) regarding
the stability test: If it turns out that citizens who are born and raised in a
well-ordered society develop the characteristics of “special psychologies”,
including envy, then it will be necessary to reconsider the adoption of the
principles of justice as fairness.
Although
Rawls believes that he has succeeded in his argument in favor of the concept of
justice as fairness, Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2020) disputes the solution to the
“problem of envy”. For the Frenchman, Rawls has not succeeded in his project;
on the contrary, he has made a fundamental philosophical error in believing
that there is a solution to the “problem of justice” and that this solution is
capable of solving the “problem of envy”. The main problem is that there is no
solution to the problem of social justice in a modern society characterized by
individualism and an aversion to externalities, let alone envy. Rawls' naivety
was to believe the words of the envious who accuse social injustice and the
randomness of nature as being the causes of both their misfortune and the
prosperity of the more favored. For Dupuy (2001), the complaint of the envious
in modern society is nothing more than a “stabilizing belief”, a way of
escaping the suffering caused by competition. The Frenchman accuses Rawls of
having ignored the lessons of Alexis de Tocqueville (2000), according to whom
the cause of the problems of modern society lies in the “equality of
conditions”, the consequences of which are: a) “hatred of the external”; and b)
“the reflux of all values into the individual sphere” (Dupuy, 2020, p.
189-190).
The only
way to solve the “problem of envy” once and for all is to return to a
hierarchical society in which “nature” determines everyone's place in the
social distribution. But no one is really willing to do that. Staying in modern
society means knowing how to deal with envy and other socially destructive
emotions. To do so, it is necessary to study: a) “how [their] effects can be
minimized or postponed”; and b) how to channel them “into benign and even
productive forms” etc. (Dupuy, 2020, p. 191). To believe that the “problem of
envy” has been solved is to put ourselves in a dangerous situation, which is
why Dupuy advocates a complete rejection of Rawls' proposal.
Based on
Dupuy's critical observations, this paper aims to examine the relevance of such
observations in terms of how the solution to the “problem of justice” may or
may not deal with the “problem of envy”; more specifically, it examines how,
based on the solution to the “problem of justice”, Rawls believes he solves the
“problem of envy”. In order to achieve this general objective, it was necessary
to understand the reasons that led to envy being considered a problem for the
conception of justice as fairness and the treatment of envy in the two parts of
the Rawlsian argument in favor of the conception of justice as fairness, with
particular emphasis in the first part on the argument that leads to the choice
of just inequality and in the second part on the solutions to the three causes
of “excusable general envy”.
Envy as a
Problem for the Concept of Justice as Fairness
Rawls
(1997, [TJ, §73], pp. 534-535) distinguishes between moral feeling and
non-moral feeling. A moral feeling requires some kind of explanation that
necessarily involves reference to a moral concept or moral principles, such as
the concepts of goodness and justice. In the case of non-moral feelings, the
explanation will be of a different kind. On the basis of this distinction,
Rawls (1997, [TJ, §80], p. 593) warns that envy should not be confused with
resentment, because “envy is not a moral feeling”, while “resentment is a moral
feeling”.
Both envy
and resentment start from the same observation: there is inequality, and those
who have less feel envy or resentment toward those who have more. In the case
of envy, it is enough to say that the realization of someone else's good
fortune creates a “sense of hurt and loss” that leads the envious person to
develop resentment and hostility toward the person who is better off than he or
she is. In the case of resentment, in addition to the realization of
inequality, the resentful person must resort to the moral principle of justice
to justify his feelings, either by accusing the social institutions of
injustice or by accusing those who have more of dishonesty. Thus, “those who
express resentment must be prepared to show why certain institutions are unjust
or how others have wronged them” (Rawls, 1997, [TJ, §80], p. 593).
Since a
well-ordered society is one that adopts the principles of justice as regulators
of its basic institutions, then there would be no reason to fear resentment,
but how can we justify concern with envy that does not arise from injustice? I
think there are two main reasons why Rawls had this kind of concern in
developing a political conception of justice: a) the strong influence of the
philosophies of Rousseau and Kant on his thinking; and b) the acceptance,
choice, and sanctioning of social and economic inequality by justice as
fairness, the main cause of the psychological and social origins of envy.
With regard
to the first reason, Rawls (1997) declares himself to be heir to the
contractualist tradition. The belief that the solution to the “problem of
justice” is capable of solving the “problem of envy” is heir to Rousseau, as
can be read in the “Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy”
(2012) dedicated to the Genevan thinker. However, his definition of envy is
clearly Kantian.
Rousseau
(1999b), as a critic of culture and civilization, argued that history had led
humanity to both individual perfection and the “decay of the species” because
of a “fatal accident”. The emergence of “self-love” is one of these accidental
causes. In short, self-love is the result of the consideration or public esteem
that arises in the social environment of preference and distinction in the face
of the observation of differences in natural talents. From distinction follows
the loss of civil equality, which is accompanied by feelings of jealousy and
envy, and the consequent destruction of sympathy and the “decay of the
species”. No influence is ascribed here to the justice or injustice of social
relations, but only to the observation of differences.
Rousseau's
wager (1999a), which is also Rawls's, is that the justice of institutions is
capable of restoring human nature degenerated by “self-love”. The difference
between a degenerate society and a just, stable, and happy society is the
constitution of legitimate power through a legitimate social compact. For
Rawls, the social contract solution to social vices would only be viable
because of two beliefs that follow from Rousseau's claim that human nature is
good but corrupted by institutions:
(a) Social
institutions and the conditions of social life primarily influence the
development and expression of certain human tendencies over time. When
realized, some of these tendencies are good and some are bad.
(b) There
is at least one possible and reasonably viable system of legitimate political
institutions that satisfies the principles of political law and meets the
requirements of institutional stability and human happiness (Rawls, 2012, p.
224).
Further on,
Rawls (2012, p. 225) adds: “The solution to our problem [of social vices] is a
social world organized in such a way that it is consistent with our true nature
and with the natural state of our amour-propre”. The basis of
inclinations are the principles of human nature, but their expression depends
on “social and historical conditions”. The challenge is to create the
conditions that lead to good inclinations and this is exactly what would happen
in a well-ordered society.
As for the
definition of envy, Kant (2013) defines it as a propensity to feel pain or
disgust at the well-being of others, which leads the envious person to wish to
destroy the happiness of others, even though this may harm them and such
happiness does not in any way diminish their own well-being. Therefore, envy is
an anti-social emotion that secretly and veiledly shows hatred for mankind.
Kant
believes that the tendency to envy is part of human nature. We are unable to
judge our own well-being by its intrinsic value, so we must resort to
comparison with the well-being of others. This comparison causes us grief when
the well-being of others overshadows our own. The problem arises only when the
indirect bad intention (invidiousness) leads to the act itself (qualified
envy). The result of qualified envy is “forgetfulness of duty to one's
neighbor” as well as the destruction of “duty to oneself” (Kant, 2013, p. 273).
Rousseau
and Kant see envy as a negative emotion that arises from interpersonal
comparison, whether of goods, talents, wealth, or anything else that is
unequally distributed, and that produces in the envious person (the one who has
less) a feeling of pain or disgust toward the envied person (the one who has
more). For both philosophers, interpersonal comparison is inevitable and
involuntary, and they also identify the intersection of gazes as a necessary
condition for the emergence of the feeling of envy, which is classified as one
of the evils of humanity. Rawls (1997, [TJ, §80], p. 592) appropriates this
idea as follows:
Then we
may think of envy as the propensity to view the greater good of others with
hostility, even when the fact that they are more fortunate than we are does not
diminish our advantages. We envy people whose situation is superior to ours
[...] and we are willing to deprive them of their greatest benefits, even if it
means giving up something.
In this
way, the manifestation of the feeling of envy presupposes a situation of
inequality in which some have more than others, and this inequality can be
compared. What makes envy a socially undesirable emotion is the fact that in
most cases it leads to a worse situation for everyone and is therefore
classified as one of the vices of misanthropy, in other words, one of the vices
that demonstrate hatred of humanity.
The other
reason why envy could threaten the stability of the concept of justice is that
a well-ordered society is just and unequal. For Rawls (1997), inequality is not
an inevitable evil, but rather a beneficial choice made by the parties in the
original position. Accepting inequality, even if it is fair, can lead to envy.
The bet is that the conception of justice as fairness creates the conditions
that prevent the development of a particular kind of envy: “excusable general
envy”.
General
envy is directed at types of goods and opportunities, as opposed to private
envy, which is tied to the possession of specific objects and positions.
According to Rawls (1997), the less advantaged would feel a kind of general
envy of the “greater wealth and opportunity” of the more advantaged, wishing to
have for themselves advantages similar to those enjoyed by members of the upper
classes, in other words, their degree of wealth and opportunity. It would
therefore not be characterized by the rivalry or competition that typically
occurs in the case of private envy. His problem, then, is “whether the
principles of justice, and especially the principle of difference, together
with fair equality of opportunity, tend in practice to produce destructive excesses
of general envy” (Rawls, 1997, [TJ, §80], p. 591).
Rawls calls
“excusable envy” the kind of envy that arises when the degree of inequality
allowed by institutions is so great that it shatters the self-esteem of the
less advantaged, leaving them with no alternative but to feel envious of the
more advantaged. This would be the only kind of envy that could be rationally
felt, and thus the only one of interest to the political conception of justice.
The social risk of “excusable general envy” is the generation of hostility from
the less favored toward the more favored, and the latter would in turn feel
feelings of jealousy, pettiness, and resentment in response to the hostility of
the envious. The result would be a weakening of the cooperative system and,
consequently, a threat to social stability.
The Two Parts
of the Contractualist Argument
Rawls
adopts a variant of the modern contractualist model to justify the choice of
the principles of justice that make up his conception of justice. The argument
for the two principles of justice is divided into two parts. In the first, the
principles are “provisionally chosen”, disregarding the influence of “special
psychologies”, including envy. The second part analyzes the stability of the
conception of justice as fairness chosen in the first part, taking into account
both “special psychologies” and the description of a well-ordered society.
The
“problem of envy” is one of the reasons for this division. Rawls argues that
the exclusion of envy in the first part simplifies reasoning when it comes to
choosing principles of justice, especially in the case of “social and economic
inequalities in which the role of envy and contempt cannot be ignored” (Rawls,
2003, [JER, §54.1], p. 257). However, the assumption that “envy does not exist”
may seem unrealistic, since this emotion affects natural persons, hence its
inclusion in the second part of the argument. However, even in the second part
of the argument, the inclusion of special psychologies can still be
challenging:
[...]
there seems to be no way of knowing in a general way, except by considering at
least the most general characteristics of the main institutions of the existing
basic structure, how susceptible people are to such tendencies [of special
psychologies] (Rawls, 2003, [JER, §54.1], p. 257-258).
To overcome
the difficulty of accounting for particular psychologies, Rawls links people's
attitudes to the kinds of institutions to which they are subject. His bet is
that if the basic institutions are fair, there is no other reason for people
not to act fairly. Therefore, the purpose of studying the effects of special
psychologies is rather to determine how institutions affect the behavior of
citizens. Thus, in order to carry out the second part of the procedure, the
first phase of choice must have been completed, so that only then can the
parties assess “the likelihood that citizens growing up in this [institutional]
background will allow themselves to be dominated by destabilizing special
attitudes [such as envy]” (Rawls, 2003, [JER, §54.2], p. 258). The argument in
favor of the principles of justice is only complete once it can be shown that
citizens who are born and grow up in a well-ordered society develop a strong
sense of justice, capable of opposing the tendencies of special psychology to
act against justice (Rawls, 2003, [JER, §54.2], p. 258).
Choosing fair
inequality
In the
first part of the argument, Rawls (1997, [TJ, §25]) describes the conditions
for deriving the principles of justice. These conditions include limiting
information by assuming the veil of ignorance and excluding envy and other
“special psychologies” from rational calculation. Rawls thinks that envy would
be irrational in that it leads people to prefer a worse situation for everyone,
i.e., the envious don't mind getting less as long as the other gets even less.
Since the parties would be rational in the original position, they shouldn't be
guided by envy. The result of the consideration is the two principles of
justice, according to which we have “inequalities sanctioned by the principle
of difference” (Rawls, 1997, [TJ, §80], p. 591), with the condition that the
least advantaged members of society should benefit as much as possible.
It is
precisely the exclusion of envy in the first part of the argument that makes it
possible to choose the situation of inequality of income and wealth on the
basis of the contractualist procedure. In fact, the most rational choice in the
original position would be absolute equality, given the condition of equality
between the parties and the restriction of information imposed by the adoption
of the veil of ignorance. Taking these characteristics into account, none of
the parties would be willing to accept less than the others or expect any of
them to accept such a condition, nor would they be able to guarantee greater
benefits for those they represent since the contingent factors that determine
them are ignored. The reasoning that leads to inequality must therefore be
secondary reasoning.
The
inequality of income and wealth is based on the argument that choosing absolute
equality would not always put everyone in the best possible situation,
especially considering that there would be an economic function that would
justify inequalities as a way of stimulating and compensating for the
investment in training and the greater responsibility required by leadership
positions, which would be important for increasing economic efficiency and,
consequently, for increasing the amount of production to be distributed. Thus,
even those who receive less, i.e., the least favored, would receive more
in the unequal and fair situation than in the initial hypothetical situation of
absolute equality.
Rawls
answers the question of what might prevent inequality from being beneficial to
all as being the frustration arising from envy:
[...] the
parties would disagree about the existence of these differences only if they
were frustrated simply because they perceive or know that others are better
off; but I suppose that they [the parties] decide [in the original position] as
one who is not motivated by envy (Rawls, 1997, [TJ, §26], p. 163).
So by
removing the feeling of envy from the rational choice calculation, fair
inequality would end up being more likely to be chosen. I say “more likely”
because the argument goes on. In addition to the economic advantage of
inequality and the exclusion of envy, Rawls includes a third element: the veto
power of the least favored. In his own words:
Since the
parties assume an equal distribution of all primary social goods, those who
benefit less have a veto, so to speak. This brings us to the principle of
difference. Taking equality as the basis for comparison, those who have gained
the most must have done so in ways that are justifiable in the eyes of those
who have gained the least (Rawls, 1997, [TJ, §26], p.
163).
Therefore,
starting from absolute equality, the reasoning that leads to the choice of
inequality must be something that everyone agrees with, especially those in the
least advantaged position. The choice of inequality would be compatible with
rationality if one considers that, since it is not possible to identify a
priori who will be the most and least favored, due to the veil of ignorance,
everyone puts themselves in the place of the least favored. In this way, the
least advantaged exercise their power of veto. Not all inequality is
acceptable, but only that which is justifiable from the point of view of the
least advantaged. According to Rawls, this is exactly what happens in the
original position. The Principles of Justice end up reflecting this by including
both absolute equality, in the first principle, and fair inequality, in the
second principle.[3]
By
admitting just inequality, Rawls can only deal with the possibility of envy in
a well-ordered society. This is done in the second part of the argument, in
particular, in §§80-81 of Theory.
The
Well-ordered Society and the Conditions of Envy
Rawls
(1997, [TJ, §81]) identifies three conditions that can foster the development
of “excusable general envy”: a) a psychological condition: in particular, low
self-esteem and feelings of inferiority; b) a first social condition: the
social structure and way of life that allow the psychological condition to be
experienced in a painful and humiliating way in the face of inequality; and c)
a second social condition: the lack of a constructive alternative for dealing
with acceptable inequalities. All these factors have as their main cause the
basic institutions of society, and for this reason their effect can be annulled
or substantially diminished by adopting the conception of justice as fairness,
since the basic institutions are the target of the conception of justice.
First
Condition: Self-Esteem, Solidarity, and Desert
As a first
condition, Rawls supposes that the main psychological root for the development
of “excusable general envy” is a lack of self-confidence (low self-esteem),
accompanied by a feeling of powerlessness (inferiority). Although this is a
psychological cause, Rawls (1997, [TJ, §81], p. 596) suggests that the basic
institutions of society are its “basic instigating cause” and not, as one might
expect, natural inclinations and dispositions. In other words, Rawls assumes
that the way society is structured can lead to a situation in which “people
lack solid confidence in their own worth and in their ability to do anything
worthwhile” (Rawls, 1997, [TJ, §81], p. 595), and this poses a problem by
creating the perfect scenario for the spread of “excusable general envy”.
We might
say, then, that Rawls regards the fact that a person has an inclination or
propensity to envy as a necessary but not sufficient condition for making him
envious. Basic institutions are an indispensable condition for these
inclinations and propensities to manifest themselves or not, and the conception
of justice as fairness, by promoting fair basic institutions, ends up promoting
greater self-confidence in citizens and a lesser sense of powerlessness “with
respect to their prospects” (Rawls, 1997, [TJ, §81], p. 595).
Rawls
argues that the conception of justice as fairness would be more efficient in
achieving these goals than other political principles because it is a
contractualist conception of justice. Since the concept of justice in a
well-ordered society is derived from a contractualist procedure, Rawls
concludes that in the public forum of a well-ordered society all citizens would
be treated as equal and sovereign, that is, as equal sources of political
power. Adopting a contractualist conception would mean that all citizens would
in principle have the same basic rights, which would be recognized in the
contractualist process. This equal treatment would strengthen the self-esteem
of citizens, especially the less favored.
It should
be noted that the primary good of the social bases of self-respect is
undoubtedly the perfect antidote to the psychological cause of “excusable
general envy”. If envy results from a loss of self-confidence or a feeling of
powerlessness, self-respect is precisely confidence in one's ability to carry
out one's life plan. Self-respect implies a desire to be recognized as “normal
and fully cooperative members of society” (Rawls, 2011, [LP, II, §7.1], p. 97).
Moreover, the primary good of the social bases of self-respect presupposes the
equal distribution of liberties and the attribution of equal social status
through equal treatment in the public sphere and the attribution of moral
desert to the possession of a sense of justice, which by definition is equal
for all, but not the unequal distribution of wealth, as is commonly the case.
In this way, Rawls seeks to break down the public distinctions that give rise
to jealousy and envy.
Another
legacy of contractualism is the development of moral capacity, a sense of
justice, and with it the bond of civility that unites the citizens of a
well-ordered society. Rawls makes clear that a sense of justice is fundamental
to stability because it provides a force against any inclination toward
injustice, and also because it produces the bonds of civility that create a
sense of belonging and contribute to citizens' self-esteem.
Another
important aspect is that, in a well-ordered society, those who have more income
and wealth are not considered to have some intrinsic value that is superior to
those who receive less. This discrepancy in income would be due to a legitimate
expectation founded on publicly recognized rules: “Having done various things,
encouraged by existing organizations, these people and groups [participating in
just organizations] now have certain rights, and the just distribution of
shares honors these claims” (Rawls, 1997, [TJ, §48], p. 343). Thus, what
justifies the difference in income is legitimate expectation, not moral desert.
If there were no desert in having more, there would be no disadvantage in
having less. This would prevent the feeling of inferiority.
It is worth
noting that for Rawls (1997, [TJ, §17], p. 115) natural endowments cannot be
seen as the source of moral desert, but rather as “facts of nature” that are
randomly distributed and have no moral value. Since there is no desert in
greater abilities, and since the “difference principle” is considered a just
principle, the benefits of greater natural endowments should be used to improve
the quality of life for everyone, not just for those who have benefited from
luck. In other words, natural endowments are a social good, not an individual
good. Rawls (1997, [TJ, §48], p. 344) argues that the higher pay of the better
off is not due to their natural endowments, but is a way of “rewarding the
costs of specialization and stimulating learning efforts, as well as directing
ability where it best serves the common interest”.
In addition
to everyone being treated equally in the public forum, having a bond of
civility arising from a sense of justice, and having their rewards defined by
legitimate expectations, Rawls adds that the conception of justice as fairness
would be incompatible with the principles of perfection and utility. While the
former seeks to ensure equal rights and opportunities for all, the latter seeks
to maximize some capacities that are socially regarded as assets at the expense
of others. This would affect the self-esteem of those who have not been
fortunate enough to possess such abilities, leading them to experience a sense
of inferiority. Thus, an analysis of the first condition for “excusable general
envy” would reject the principle of perfection and utility.
The
conclusion Rawls reaches in analyzing the first condition of envy is that
inequalities, whether absolute or relative, would be more easily accepted in a
well-ordered society. In such a society, the basic institutions would guarantee
that the less favored would not lack self-esteem or feel inferior, and
therefore would have no reason to be afflicted by “excusable general envy”.
The problem
is that Rawls fails to note that distinction is an involuntary process, and
even if public esteem is tied to an equally distributed characteristic, such as
liberty or a sense of justice, it ends up being a fragile process. Even if
public treatment is equal, this does not mean that there is no comparison
between people on the basis of their different characteristics, or that there
is no distinction on the basis of criteria other than those established by the
primary good of the social bases of self-respect, such as the differential
possession of income and wealth.
Moreover,
Rawls does not observe that there is a comparison between those who consider
themselves equal or who want to be equal, even in the face of their
differences. Dupuy (2020), drawing on Tocqueville, points out that the greater
the equality, the more equality is demanded. This is also the position of
Ben-Ze'ev (2013, p. 543): “It is not a feeling of general inferiority that
makes us envious, but the feeling of inferiority in relation to people who are
affectively close to us”. Rawls goes in the opposite direction, allowing only
extreme inequality as a cause of envy relevant to the political conception of
justice.
As for the
sense of justice, it's hard to deny that the “desire to act justly” arises as
an effect of reciprocity in a just society; but envy, not being the result of
injustice, can easily persist even when socially denied. The most appropriate
question to ask at this point in the argument is: do you stop wishing the other
person good luck or comparing yourself to them because the social system is
just? Rawls's solution is to regard such comparisons as politically
insignificant, and they cannot be the subject of public demand because they are
not based on the violation of any of the primary goods on the list of the weak
theory of the good, the only criterion Rawls accepts for interpersonal
comparisons.[4]
In the end,
Rawls (2003, [JER, §21.4], p. 108) cannot escape the influence of arbitrary
factors, because the most advantaged are the most talented, even if they don't
deserve it. Faced with the inevitable, the alternative was to regard natural
inequalities as politically irrelevant, since all citizens have the moral,
intellectual, and physical capacities at the minimum level necessary to be
fully cooperative members of society throughout their lives, and the variations
that raise or lower these capacities are dealt with “by social practices”
(Rawls, 2011, [LP, V, §3. 5], p. 217), one of which is “fair equality of
opportunity”, which would equalize naturally unequal capacities and guarantee
the fair outcome of competition. However, that solution encounters another
difficulty: justice guarantees “fair equality of opportunity”, but not equal
results. For Dupuy (2020), Rawls does not solve the “problem of envy” because
his solution not only excludes the possibility of the less favored blaming
social injustice for their failure, but also makes it clear to everyone that
the place they occupy in social distribution is due to their “degenerate
nature”, or their bad luck throughout life. For Dupuy, this would be the cause
of a great deal of suffering that would make a well-ordered society unbearable
(invivable[5]).[6]
Second
Condition: Degree of Inequality, Social Structure and Lifestyle
If in the
first condition the focus was on the “psychological conditions” of envy, in the
second condition Rawls (1997, [TJ, §81]) analyzes the “social conditions” that
can reinforce the “psychological conditions” according to which the less
advantaged experience their social position in the face of discrepancies in the
distribution of income and wealth. The basic idea is that the constant
visibility of these discrepancies, caused by certain social structures and
lifestyles in society, means that the less favored are constantly reminded of
their social condition, creating a painful and humiliating experience that can
lead the less favored to become dissatisfied with their own lifestyles and with
themselves. Rawls's defense is that in a well-ordered society, both social
structures and lifestyles are constituted in such a way that such experiences
have no place. Therefore, the less favored would have no reason to feel
humiliated by their social position.
With regard
to social structure, Rawls (1997, [TJ, §81], p. 596-597) deals with the social
impacts of absolute and relative inequalities acceptable in a well-ordered
society. If we remember that for the philosopher the source of the feeling of
envy is the disgust caused by the observation of the social inequality between
citizens, and that the greater this inequality, the greater the feeling of
disgust, it is worth asking: What level of inequality would be compatible with
justice?
In a
society that is publicly regarded as just, social and economic inequalities may
be permitted, provided that this permission is limited to inequalities that
make life as good as possible for everyone, especially the least favored.
However, Rawls (2003, [JER, §19.2], p. 96n) acknowledges that there is no
constraint in the model on the degree of inequality that a society can adopt.
This lack of criteria for judging the degree of inequality can create a
difference that leads to an undesirable consequence: a just society, but one
with an inequality that is perceived as unjust, especially by the less favored,
and is therefore uncomfortable and “makes us think” (Rawls, 2003, §19.2, p.
96n). This discomfort is the same that potentially leads to “excusable general
envy”, which gives rise to a painful and humiliating experience. Ultimately,
one can only hope that, after the two principles of justice have been applied
according to the lexical order, the basic institutions of society will limit
observable inequality to a level that does not cause such discomfort.
For Rawls
(2003, [JER, § 13.1], p. 60), the application of the principles of justice
should follow a lexical order, so that the application of the “difference
principle” would come after the guarantee of equal freedom for all and “fair
equality of opportunity”. The latter would play a decisive role in limiting
inequalities by guaranteeing a wide range of specialized training and,
consequently, increasing the chances of occupying the best jobs. Moreover, the
higher expectations of the more favored would be conditioned on “ways necessary
to improve the situation of the less favored”, and such higher expectations
“presumably cover the costs of training or meet organizational needs, and thus
contribute to the general good” (Rawls, 1997, [TJ, §26], p. 170). The increase
in the expectations of the better off would be limited by criteria other than
those expressed in the “difference principle”. Thus, if Rawls is right, the
social structure of the well-ordered society would allow inequality, but would
not allow it to be large enough to be troublesome.
With
respect to lifestyle, Rawls (1997, [TJ, §81], p. 597) argues that in a
well-ordered society this style would not encourage situations in which
inequalities would be felt in a painful and humiliating way, because of two
assumptions: 1) in a society made up of a plurality of associations – in the
sense of belonging to groups – greater inequalities would not be so visible,
and comparisons would be made between those who are not so far apart in terms
of income and wealth; and 2) since it is assumed that natural duties of justice
are observed in such a society, the more favored would have no reason to flaunt
them.
Rawls
(1997, [TJ, §81], p. 597) argues that in a well-ordered society, inequalities
would not generate envy because there would be “ignorance of differences in
income and circumstances”, since such a society would consist of various
associations divided into numerous groups, so that the differences between the
members of the groups would not be so noticeable. For him, belonging to
associations can be understood as belonging to groups: family (as a small
association), school, neighborhood, professional association, religious
associations, among others. The idea is that inequality is only felt in a
painful and humiliating way when the less favored are constantly reminded of
their condition. The social division into groups would make people live more
with others of the same income and wealth level. According to Rawls (1997, [TJ,
§81], p. 597): “we tend to compare our circumstances with those of people who
belong to our group or to some other similar group, or who occupy positions
that we consider appropriate to our aspirations”. In addition to the fact that
lifestyle makes interpersonal comparison difficult, Rawls supposes that when
the citizens of the well-ordered society are in the public environment, that
is, an environment frequented by citizens from other social groups, the fact
that everyone is treated equally would mean that no one would feel humiliated
because of their social situation.
The final
element related to lifestyle is that in a well-ordered society, the more
favored would not feel the need to show off in order to belittle the less
favored because there is no generalized envy in a well-ordered society. Rawls
(1997, [TJ, §81], p. 597) believes that the attitude of ostentation would arise
from the opposite of envy, that is, from the feelings of jealousy, stinginess,
and resentment that would arise as a form of defense against the hostility of
the envious. Therefore, if there were no general feeling of envy, there would
be no opposite.
In
addition, the better off would have no reason to promote situations that
produce feelings of humiliation in the less well off, since there would be a
relationship of obligation on their part to the scheme of cooperation. Rawls
(1997, [TJ, §19], p. 123) presents two principles for individuals: a) the
“natural duty of justice”, according to which “everyone has a natural duty to
do his part in the existing system”; and b) the “principle of equity”, which
obliges those who are more favored to promote social welfare from their
privileged positions. For Rawls (1997, [TJ, §19], p. 124), there would be
“another sense of noblesse oblige: namely, that the more privileged are
likely to have obligations that bind them more strongly to a just scheme”. This
bond would prevent them from boasting without reason.
Since Rawls
assumes that envy is limited to the “excusable general envy” that results from
extreme inequality, and since he recognizes that there is no limit to the
degree of inequality that justice will allow as fairness, his concern in the
second condition of envy was to deal with the intersection of gazes. Much of
the argument rests on the hope that: a) inequality will not be extreme because
of the lexical order in which the principles of justice are applied; b) people
will live in more homogeneous environments; and c) the better off will not feel
the need to show off. Such hopes would be inadequate if we consider that in a
society that preaches the equality of all, envy arises even in the face of
small inequalities.
Third Condition: Constructive Alternatives to the Hostility of Envy
The third
condition that would lead to envy would be that the less favored would believe
that there are no “constructive alternatives to the better circumstances of the
more advantaged” (Rawls, 1997, [TJ, §81], p. 595), so that the feelings of
inferiority and anxiety generated by inequality could only be alleviated by
imposing a loss on the more favored, even if this resulted in a worse situation
for everyone.
Unlike the
previous factors, Rawls (1997, [TJ, §81], p. 597) provides no justification for
his belief that “a well-organized society, like any other, offers constructive
alternatives to hostile outbursts of envy”. What might these “constructive
alternatives” be? Rawls doesn't bother to specify what they might be, and he
also notes that the possibility of constructing such alternatives would not be
exclusive to a well-ordered society, nor would it have any advantage over any
other. Thus, it would seem that the “constructive alternatives” would not be
associated with a constructivist doctrine such as the theory of justice as
fairness.
Final
considerations
Interpersonal
comparison is undoubtedly the catalyst for generalized envy, whether it is
justifiable or not. As we have seen, comparisons arise involuntarily, without
relying on or realizing a voluntary attitude. If envy arises fundamentally from
the meeting of eyes, and in justice as fairness, because of its contractual
origin, people must look at each other and be committed to each other, how can
envy be avoided and the meeting of eyes be maintained in a well-ordered
society?
Rawls
suggested that the transition from just inequality to “excusable general envy”
could be avoided: a) if the basic institutions of society were just; b) if the
people born and raised in the well-ordered society developed a strong sense of
justice; c) if public esteem were linked to the same social status of equal
citizenship for all, according to the primary good of the social bases of
self-respect; d) if each person's place in the distribution of social benefits
and burdens were the result of legitimate expectations and not arbitrary
factors or the attribution of moral desert in the strict sense; e) if just
inequality were not extreme; and f) if social life were more homogeneous. In
this way, Rawls argues, the conditions for the development of “excusable
general envy” would not exist, and the grievances of the envious against just
inequalities would be appeased.
My
conclusion is that Rawls' solution to the “problem of envy”, which involves
solving the “problem of justice”, is only adequate if we accept that only
“excusable general envy” is politically relevant. However, like Dupuy, I
believe that this delimitation is inadequate because it ignores the fact that
the nature of envy is fundamentally the intersection of gazes, and that this
feeling can result in political demands for more equality in a society marked
by difference, but which preaches political equality.
I also
agree with Dupuy that Rawls, in his effort to deal with the “problem of envy”,
had difficulty dealing with “chance”. This is evident in the way Rawls treats
differences in natural talents in a society that guarantees “fair equality of
opportunity” without guaranteeing equal outcomes. The issue is neither the
desert of individual values nor injustice, but natural arbitrariness. Rawls
tries to exclude externalities, but the “failure” of the less favored is due
solely to their inferior natural condition or their bad luck in life.
Unlike the
French author, I believe that the adoption of equal citizenship status for all,
linked to the primary good of the social bases of self-respect, and the
development of a strong sense of justice, linked to moral psychology, are the
main elements presented by Rawls to solve the “problem of envy”, distinguished
from “excusable general envy”, which fails in the face of other forms of envy.
In the end,
“excusable general envy” is only one facet of envy, and Rawls's solution is
only partially successful, since the philosopher considers it sufficient for
the purposes of the political conception of justice. But not to recognize the
facet of envy that arises from comparison, even under conditions of political
equality and justice, is to be left in the vulnerable position of doing nothing
about the discomfort that persists in the face of inequality.
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Alexsandra Andrade Santana
PhD in
Philosophy from the Universidade Federal de Sergipe, a Master's and a
Bachelor's degree in Philosophy from the Universidade Federal da Bahia. She is currently a Substitute
Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the Universidade Federal de
Sergipe.
The texts of this article were
reviewed by third parties and submitted for validation by the author(s) prior
to publication.
[1] The present article
synthesizes the central argument of my doctoral thesis entitled “Envy in the
well-ordered, just, and unequal society”, publicly defended at the Federal
University of Sergipe. This work received financial support from the
Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES).
[2] Freeman (2007) lists three possible reasons
for the lack of impact of the argument in favor of congruence between the just
and the good, which is also found in Part III of Theory: 1) the fact
that Theory is a long book and congruence is only dealt with in §86; 2)
the lack of clarity in the exposition of the last part, in which Rawls deals
with various issues; and 3) the judgment of the argument as weak by some of the
major commentators. I believe that these factors also affected the impact of
the stability test on the “envy problem”. The issue of stability came to occupy
a central place after the publication of Liberalism, whether explicitly
or not, but in the context of the revised argument. Hill Jr. (1994), Klosko
(1994), Hampton (1994), and Barry (1995) are some of the authors who deal with
stability but not envy.
[3] This is the final version of the two
principles of justice chosen in the original position: “(a) every person has
the same irrevocable right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties
compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and (b) social and
economic inequalities must satisfy two conditions: first, they must be related
to jobs and positions accessible to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and second, they must benefit the least advantaged members of
society as much as possible (the difference principle)” (Rawls, 2003, [JER,
§13.1], p. 60).
[4] According to Rawls (2003, [JER, §17.2], p.
82-83), the identification of the least favored is given from a list of primary
goods, since only the primary goods of the powers and prerogatives of authority
and the primary good of income and wealth are the only ones that would be
distributed unequally, therefore “the least favored are those who belong to the
income class with the lowest expectations” (Rawls, 2003, [JER, §17.3], p. 83).
[5] Invivable, from the French, in a direct translation would be “invivible”, a
term that doesn't exist in Portuguese, in the sense of somewhere you can't
live.
[6] For more details on Dupuy's
argument, see Santana (2021).