Martin Heidegger and Aristotle: The Interpretation of Sophía in Metaphysics I, Chapters 1-2

Martin Heidegger e Aristóteles. A interpretação da σοφία na Metafísica I, capítulos 1-2

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to present Heidegger`s intentions based on the interpretation of chapters 1 and 2 of Book I of Aristotle`s *Metaphysics* in their most important elements. These intentions are made explicit in the so-called *Natorp-Bericht* of 1922. I will highlight in particular the phenomenological interpretation of Aristotelian wisdom (σοφία). In this way, Heidegger considers fundamental not only the sense that the dianoetic virtues (σοφία and φρόνησις) come from the illumination of the interaction of factic life with the *world-around* (*Umwelt*), but also the fact that σοφία, as a tendency towards *pure contemplation*, is a derived form, rooted in the facticity of Dasein and, therefore, based on an original ontological priority.

Keywords: phenomenology; hermeneutics; ontology; facticity; mobility.

RESUMO

O objetivo do artigo consiste expor as intenções de Heidegger a partir da interpretação dos capítulos 1 e 2 do Livro I da *Metafísica* de Aristóteles em seus elementos mais importantes. Tais intenções são explicitadas no chamado *Natorp-Bericht* de 1922. Destacarei de modo particular a interpretação fenomenológica da σοφία aristotélica. Desse modo, Heidegger julga fundamentais não somente o sentido de que as virtudes dianoéticas (σοφία e φρόνησις) provenham da *iluminação* do trato da vida fática com o *mundo do entorno* (*Umwelt*), mas também o fato de que a σοφία, enquanto tendência para o *contemplar puro*, seja uma forma *derivada*, arraigada na facticidade do *Dasein* e, portanto, com base em uma propriedade ontológica originária.

Palavras-chave: fenomenologia; hermenêutica; ontologia; facticidade; mobilidade.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of my analysis is to make explicit Heidegger`s appropriation of chapters 1 and 2 of Book I of *Aristotle`s Metaphysics*. The interpretation of these passages begins explicitly in the first Fribourg term, firstly in the lecture of the summer semester of 1922, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Selected Treatises of Aristotle on Logic and Ontology* (GA 62), secondly in the *Natorp Report* of the same year, and finally, in a more detailed manner, in the Marburg lecture of the winter semester of 1924/1925, Plato: The Sophist (GA 19). Based primarily on the Natorp-Bericht (Natorp-Report), which addresses the fundamental modalities of human orientation in the world (θεωρία [theory by pure beholding], ποίησις ̋μακινῷ̈, πρᾶξις ̋doing, human action]) and the corresponding "knowledges," (σοφία [original understanding], τέχνη [art], φρόνησις [prudent insight into situation of action]), I will particularly emphasize the phenomenological interpretation of σοφία: setting aside the simultaneity of the phenomena of poíēsis and theōria as articulated by Aristotle, Heidegger considers that, on one hand, the significance of both dianoetic virtues (σοφία ∈ φρόνησις) arises from the *illumination* of the interaction between factual life and its world, and on the other hand, that σοφία, as *pure contemplation* is a derived form, rooted in the facticity of Dasein and thus grounded in an original ontological priority. The σοφιϖα, as the primary tendency of being-there, is realized precisely through the path that leads from the productive relationship (τέχνη) in pure contemplation (θεωρεῖν). Thus, the emphasis of Heideggerian appropriation is not so much on the autonomy of σοφία – either from its object or from the behavior of being-there itself (Heidegger, 1992 [GA 19], p. 122-125) - but rather on the "connection of meaning between careful handling and enlightenment" (Heidegger, 2005 [GA 62], p. 78) inherent in phatic life.

1. The phenomenon of "knowing" as modalities of illumination (Erhellung) resulting from dealing with factual life in its fundamental character of movement (κίνησις)

Based on the supplements added by the editors in the publication of the Fribourg lecture from the summer semester of 1922 (GA 62), titled "Phenomenological Interpretations of Selected Treatises of Aristotle on Logic and Ontology," Heidegger`s intentions regarding his direct engagement with Aristotelian texts are clear: to attain a principled understanding of Aristotelian ontology (being – meaning) as it pertains to the entities of nature. In this context, the fundamental concepts emerge as definitive determinations for the tendency of temporalization in knowledge, specifically:

"references to the achievement of pre-availability (*Vorhabe*), claims of questioning, extension of explanation, originality of conceptuality" (Heidegger, 2005 [GA 62], p. 118). This new understanding of Aristotle`s ontology then implies the fact that the phenomena of "knowing" (τὸ εἰδέναι) and "knowledge"(τὸ ἐπίστασθαι), in their most characteristic tendency to observe and determine – that is, precisely as knowledge of principles, causes and elements or, in Heideggerian terms, bringing to familiarity the vision of why (*Woraus, Warum, Womit: whence*, why, with-what) without expressly having a pre-availability (*Vorhabe*) (Heidegger, 2005, p. 123-124) –, arise and grow as a motility of life itself in dealing with its world in an organizing, producing, treating and determining. I refer here, in a special way, to the intellectual virtues of νοῦς and of φρόνησις: before all theoretical contemplation, the origin of human knowledge comes from a certain illumination inherent in dealing (*Umgang*), which has the sense of the custody of being. How does Heidegger decline such virtues phenomenologically in his texts from the first Fribourg period and in the Marburg courses?

On one hand, we are faced with the νοῦς [as pure *grasping: vernehmen*] that precedes the λόγος, when the latter is understood in the strict sense of *affirmation* and *negation* (the scope of apophantic discourse as it constitutes the place of true and false, that is, the sphere of predicative judgment). In this respect, the "genuinely objectual element of the νοῦς is that which it grasps *without discourse* (ἄνευ λόγου = without articulation), without the modality of calling something into question in relation to its determinants-as-thing Division, as a grasping that decomposes [what is grasped] in the discussion as a synthetic determination, is no longer possible here. Insofar as the νοῦς grasps the *principles* with an act of an intuitive type, unitary and undivided, the false cannot happen in the νοεῖν (*vernehmen*). This "taking" of apprehension (*nehmen* do *vernehmen*) does not imply taking possession of what is seized, but taking while taking into one`s custody (*In die Acht nehmen*) what appears in the collection in and by ("say" [sagen derives from the high German *sagan*, which means to show] and "put" [*legen*]) (Zarader, 1998, p. 232-233). This way, the νοῦς, insofar as, in every concrete discussion, the what-about (*Worüber*) of all speaking, that is, "the thing called in question" (in the *Besprechen*), is in the truth and there is no falsehood in it, that is, the "from where" is always available as long as it is not veiled. Why? Because it learns the ἀρχή as evident and keeps it guarded or protected "as a constant fundamental orientation"[1]. Such is the scope of true apprehension that is at stake here in the Heideggerian appropriation of the Aristotelian νοῦς as a guiding thread for the other modalities of unveiling principles.

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[1] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 382.

This priority of νοῦς, understood here as illumination of the observing treatment in factual life, demonstrates a possible direction of the mobility of life according to the two basic directions of σοφία – φρόνησις (Heidegger, 2005, p. 404), and this in accordance with a precise hierarchy of the process of "understanding" assumed in the specifically practical sense and based on the genetic connection in Book I, chapter 1, of Aristotle`s *Metaphysics*, be it from the connection of Physics research as a ground for ontological research (κίνησις): αἴσθησις (*sensation*), μνήμη (*memory*), ἐμπειρία (*experience*), τέχνη (*technique*), σοφία (*wisdom*) (φρόνησις) (*circumspection*). This hierarchy of knowledge is called *the formation of the circumvision [or circumspection] (Umsicht) of the free mobility* of the being of human *Dasein* in its world (Heidegger, 1993 [GA 22], p. 25), that is, a hierarchy that displays the multiplicity of *possibilities* and *modalities of unconcealing* (ἀληθεύειν = taking out of concealment, making unveiled [...], knowing as appropriated knowledge: certainty) (Heidegger, 1993, p. 25) what is veiled: σοφώτερος, μᾶλλον σοφός (ἔνδοξον)[2]. Now, in the formation of the *circumvision of free mobility,* which characterizes the fundamental behavior of the true being of human *Dasein*, it is possible to glimpse an original *attitude* determined only from the motility of life as caring (*Sorgen*). n this *attitude* reside the modalities of illumination of the phenomenon of human "knowing" which, based on the interpretation of chapters 1 and 2 of Book I of *Metaphysics*, is always seen in its fundamental character of movement. The modalities of dealing with factual life are the following: "illumination, clarification ('illumination' in the formal sense), seeing-around, circumspection, contemplating, observing, determining observer (understanding), authentic understanding" (Heidegger, 2005, p .115). These modalities of illumination are assumed from the factual dealing, remaining in *it* and *for it*; therefore,

> Understanding is primarily interpreted as a how (*Wie*) of dealing [the (i)lumination of dealing – circumspection (*Umsicht*)], which carries with it the possibility of formation for an independent dealing. The independence of the understanding dealing temporalizes a proper how (*Wie*) of life, and precisely as qewriva, the most elevated and authentic as (Wie) of human Dasein (Heidegger, 2005, p. 115-116) (Heidegger, 2005, p. 115-116).

Hence the phenomenological explanation of the main modes of unveiling and understanding in the *Natorp Report*.: "Σοφία (the authentic understanding observer) and φρόνησις (the solicitous circumspection: *fürsorgende Umsich*) will be interpreted as the authentic modalities that accomplish the νοῦς of pure apprehension (*vernehmen*) as such"[3]. In this respect the νοῦς of men is the same as a διανοει϶ν, that is, a calling into question (ansprechen) something as something νοεῖν one

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[2] Aristóteles, *Metaphysics* A 1, 982 a 13ss; a 15 ss: "wiser than [another]", 'wiser', 'opinion'.

[3] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 376.

that is determined solely on the basis of λόγος, that is, expresses "the observation through, which is a speaking, λέγειν" (Heidegger, 1992 [GA 19], p. 180). This means that the human νοῦς in his dealings with the world around him (*Umwelt*) has the character of διά (δια-νοεῖν) precisely because it is determined by the way of being that belongs primarily to men. The νοεῖν (thinking), therefore, always takes place in the space of an entity that has λόγος (speech, articulation), realized in and through language (See. Agnello, 2006, p. 86): "the νοεῖν has the fundamental character of apprehension. The νοῦς is apprehension pure and simple, that is, that which originally gives, makes possible and toward-which [horizon] (*Worauf* = Toward-which) to any 'deal-with' (*Umgangmit*) generally oriented"[4]. In this sense, learning through λέγειν always implies being led into the heart of a very specific situation and, in this way, calling into question [ansprechen] something as something (*etwas als etwas*).

By interpreting the Aristotelian νοῦς as a "pure grasping", that is, as an "unconcealing *(Aufdecken)* of principles without discourse", as a pre-linguistic faculty, Heidegger not only subtracts Aristotelian exegesis from the interpretative criteria of the hermeneutic paradigms of realism and idealism, but also excludes from the metaphysical conception present in the Greek world any form of separation between mind and world, language and pre-linguistic reality, thanks to the influence of phenomenology that considers the knowing subject and the known object as co-originary (Agnello, 2006, p. 67-68). Aristotle and the Greeks thus designate the things themselves – that is, the something as something in λέγειν – not distinguishing between a subject and an object, but as πράγματα, that is, the things that were produced [from something], say, from the tree, for example, that is in the forest: the trunk, instead of being mere wood, a physical thing (ontic or pre-ontological sense), comes to meet me in worldly dealings in the character of "usability for...", of availability for building a ship. The trunk has the character of *being useful to...*, of being usable for..." (*ontological* sense): in this character of "*usability for...*" (*Verwendbarkeit zu...*) belonging to the trunk lies the character of be targeted in Heidegger`s hermeneutic phenomenology (Heidegger, 2002, p. 300, our translation).

On the other hand, we have the virtue of φρόνησις, which is true because it carries out a total appropriation of the "principles of πράττειν ἀληθεύειν [the being in the true, the unveiling] in the φρόνησις is more original than in the θεωρεῖν, since the latter performs the ἀληθεύειν, perspectively', whereas φρόνησις performs it 'respectively'", that is, the φρόνησις, that *un-covers* (ent-*decken*), makes an action *transparent* (unveiled = *unverborgen*) in itself (Heidegger, 2005, p. 414;

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[4] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 380.

Heidegger, 1992, p. 53). This is the concrete scope of pragmatic dealing with the world. In terms of the *Natorp-Report*, Heidegger declines the Aristotelian phenomenological structures of θεωρεῖν eand of φρόνησις as follows:

> the purely observant understanding brings into custody the being that together with its 'from-where' is in the way in which it is always and necessarily what it is; the circumspection [seeing oneself around or circumvision] that discusses, on the other hand, [guards] an entity that in itself in its 'from-where' *(Von-Wo-Aus) can be different*[5].

 Furthermore, we also come across the paradoxical distinction between σοφία and θεωρεῖν: whereas θεωρεῖν is derived, as an illustration of the fall, and "the highest temporalization of seeing-around, of observing" (Heidegger, 2005, p. 116), "σοφία, on the contrary, went through the stop or address (Aufenthalt): the radicalization of the θεωρεῖν, a way of occupying oneself, which originates from τέχνη, originally constitutive of both practice and theory" (Heidegger, 2005, p. 414-415). In the case of a phenomenological understanding of σοφία, what it means to cross this *stop* as to absorb oneself in (*Aufgehen 'in'*) something whose horizon is devoid of understanding as a way of dealing with life extracted from its fundamental character of motility? It is about the existential *pause* in a decision that is capable of taking care of the thing itself (*im Da-sein*) with which, each time, it is: "such a lingering (*Verweilen*), in a first approximation and most of the time, is not just a contemplative lingering, but precisely a being-occupied with something", Heidegger will affirm in *Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity* – 1923) (Heidegger, 1988 [GA 63], p. 87), whether in *Fundamental Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* (1924) when he spoke of the elimination of fear in relation to the ancients' discussion about the being of nature and the being-there of the world: "authentic possibility is constituted by , by 'stopping' (*Aufenthalt*) in the pure contemplation of the world, to which nothing else can happen [...]. The highest possibility of existence, yes, which makes the threat no longer continue to exist, is the pure θεωρεῖν and, therefore, genuine ἡδονή, science" (Heidegger, 2002 [GA 18], p. 290). The *stop* is, therefore, a particular intensification of the mobility of care, in which life acquires a new state, in such a way that what is astonished about becomes the object of care[6].

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[5] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 382.

[6] See the parallel passage in GA 63: "It is an erroneous thing – precisely in order to be able to see the mobility of life, to lead it objectively to the preliminary possession (*Vorhabe*) of the categorical explanation – to claim to participate in mobility as such. Mobility can only be seen properly from the genuine 'stop' ('*Aufenthalt*') each time (*jeweilig*). The existential stop, in this stop; what to establish as a state of stillness? But precisely for this reason, the supreme task is to achieve a genuine stop and not an arbitrary one; the stop before the possible leap of the preoccupied decision; it is not spoken of, but it is constantly there. In the stop, movement is visible and thus, and from it, as a

The Heideggerian attempt to distinguish between σοφία and θεωρεῖν, relating the first virtue, *primarily*, to φρόνησις, that is, to the so-called "practical truth", despite the fact that the σοφία for the Stagirite it is always "theoretical reason"(*diánoia theōritikè*)[7], reveals that neither an orthodox interpretation of Aristotle nor an interpretation in the classical sense of the term is at stake. For example, Heidegger returns Aristotle`s main argument (that is, *against* the primacy of φρόνησις) to Aristotle himself by saying: as the σοφία, fixed in the eternal and necessary, could it be the eminent virtue to exercise happiness if it deviates from the "being-there of man", if it finds its eminent object beyond the becoming of this mortal and contingent (historical) being exposed to the constant possibility of not being? The Aristotelian σοφία would not be concerned, in this way, with "human being-there whose being consists in being γένεσις, πρᾶξις, κίνησις (Heidegger, 1992, p. 167). If an interpretation must go beyond what is initially present in the text, far from being an insertion of meaning, it is precisely about "discovering what was inexpressibly present among the Greeks" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 77-78), since the human being "is a particular being that discovers the other being and itself not only in a successive moment, but φύσει. *With his being, the world and himself are already discovered for him,* indeterminate, vague, uncertain. *The world: the narrowest, being itself*" (Heidegger, 1993, p. 25, our translation).

On the basis of the effort to "de-rude" Aristotle`s conceptuality - especially by questioning the determinations of present-being [Gegenwärtigsein] and produced-being [Hergestelltsein] in relation to the φύσει ὄντα –, Heidegger searches for traces of an association of his thought with factual life, which can serve as a preliminary structure for understanding philosophy in terms closer to human existence in its facticity than as a contemplation of the distant absolute that no longer affects our mundane daily life. In this period, the object of philosophical investigation for Heidegger is factual *existence* insofar as it is interrogated as to its character of being. n emblematic example of this attempt will be the replacement of the genealogy of σοφία found in *Metaphysics* I, chapters 1-2, by the fundamental association of σοφία and θεωρία and the reduction of σοφία το to its practical-productive origin. For Heidegger, the σοφία is, therefore, na original tendency of *Dasein*, which is inevitably realized through the path that goes from the productive relationship to pure contemplation under an ontological priority (SEGURA PERAITA, 2002, p. 125). In the mere "introductory part" of almost 200 pages to the interpretation of the *Sophist* in GA 19 (Heidegger, 1992, 21-188) we witness the interconnection of Heidegger`s interpretation of

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genuine stop, the possibility of counter-movement": Heidegger, 1988, p. 109.

[7] Aristóteles, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 2,1139 a 26-27.

Aristotle (as an interpreter of the Aristotelian text) and his own phenomenological-hermeneutic project, an interconnection marked by the tension between the Aristotelian primacy of *theōria* and the Heideggerian intention to modify it to show its *derivative* character. Judging by Heidegger`s own indication, in a letter of November 19, 1922 to Karl Jaspers[8], regarding the existence of extensive interpretations already carried out in 1922, the Marburgian lecture of the winter semester of 1924-1925 still reflects the Heideggerian interpretations of Aristotle from 1922 of the first period of Fribourg, that is, they are the conclusion of a historical-destructive movement of conceptuality which coincided with philosophy as such: "factic life will never appropriate itself authentically without historical destruction; praxis will never understand itself authentically without theory. The scheme of historical destruction obviously results in a kind of primacy of the θεωρία (Thanassas, 2012, p. 47) that, as σοφία (φρόνησις), will be understood within a factual, historical and temporal framework.

Once these preliminary considerations have been made about Heidegger`s intentions in approaching the phenomenon of understanding from an original attitude based on the modalities of illumination, let us move on to examine the phenomenological appropriation of σοφία in the first chapters of Aristotle`s *Metaphysics I* in the *Natorp Report* (1922), but without failing to mention the more detailed approach in the Marburg lecture entitled *Plato: the Sophist* (1924/1925)[9].

2. The σοφία understood from the guiding thread of facticity in the Natorp-Report

After programmatically commenting on Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Heidegger turns to a preliminary interpretation of chapters 1 and 2 of Book I of *Metaphysics* in order to explain the fundamental problem of facticity within which the σοφία, which is for Aristotle "the highest mode

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[8] Quoted in the 1922 Fribourg lecture: M. Heidegger, 2005, p. 441-442: "When I returned here, Husserl was waiting for me with the news of the announcement in Marburg about my lectures on Aristotle, etc.; Natorp wanted concrete guidance on my work projects. I then worked for three weeks, collected notes from my own texts, and wrote an 'Introduction'". This is certainly both the *Natorp Report* (first published in 1989, then in 2003 and definitively in 2005) and the Fribourg lecture from the summer semester of 1922 published in GA 62 in 2005.

[9] See Sources: GA 62, In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 13-113: "Translation and interpretation of Metaphysics A 1 and A 2 [§§ 6-12]"; IDEM, Natorp-Bericht, In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 387-390; GA 19, In: Heidegger, 1992, p. 57-64; GA 22, In: Heidegger, 1993, p. 24-31 (§§ 9 and 10: "Different modes of discovering and understanding"; "Further characterizátion of σοφία", respectively). See the general commentary in SEGURA PERAITA, 2002, p. 113-132; For the genesis of the sense of the theoretic and the determination of theōria as the highest motility of life in Metaphysics A, 1-2; Θ, 6 ανδ Λ, 6, see also Yfantis, 2009, p. 149-164.

of existence for man" and, at the same time, "the ἀρετή of τέχνη" (*Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 7; 1141 a 12) (Heidegger, 1992 [GA 19], p. 56-57). Hence the initial indications of two ways in which *Dasein* deals with its world. On the one hand, the ἐπιστήμη (*science*) and the σοφία that belong to the "scientific" part of the unveiling soul, that is, "that with which we contemplate entities whose principles cannot be otherwise": this is the ἐπιστημοτικόν, that is, λόγος that which can contribute to developing knowledge, one that serves as an aid to the development of knowledge. In this first type of *having language*, as the being of these knowledges must *necessarily* be the way they are, and cannot behave in any other way, "the existence of both the living being and the world in totality is determined as αἰών (eternity/present)" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 33). Thus, within the scope of what promotes knowledge, Heidegger presents the first modality of treatment in 1922: "the understanding that determines through observation [ἐπιστήμη] is only a modality in which the being is guarded: the being that necessarily and in most cases is what it is"[10].

On the other hand, the τέχνη (*technique*) – whose object is what must first be produced as something different (ἔργον = work), that is, what is not yet, but will be (ἐσόμενον) (Heidegger, 1992, p. 40) – and the φρόνησις, which has as its object of reflection *life itself* (ζωή) insofar as its purpose is *praxis*. In this case, it is the same being as the one that reflects, that is, *Dasein* itself: "in the ποίησις [production], the τέλος [end] is something different, in the case of πρᾶξις [action], however, no; the same εὐπραξία [full action] is the τέλος [end]" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 49). In this aspect, τέχνη and φρόνησις belong to the "calculative" (λογιστικόν) part of soul, that is, that which can contribute to developing the βουλεύεσθαι, to consider with circumspection, to deliberate; that λόγος which serves as an aid to the development of deliberation. In this sense, unlike the ἐπιστήμη, "the possibility of making mistakes is a prerogative that belongs to the τέχνη itself [...]. This possibility of being able to err is constitutive for the formation of τέχνη" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 54). The same does not apply to φρόνησις, "which is nothing other than moral conscience set in motion, which makes an action transparent. One cannot forget conscience" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 56). Based on the *ontological* separation internal to the human experience of the world made by Aristotle himself in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1139 a 6 ss) – that is, between the "scientific" and "calculative" parts of the soul –, Heidegger states in this regard: "this world of nature, which is always as it is, is to a certain extent the background from which the power-to-be-different stands out. This distinction is a completely original distinction [...]. This distinction", continues Heidegger, – far from being "two spheres of being established side by side in theoretical

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[10] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 375.

consideration" –, "is *the world* and its first ontological articulation in general" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 29). Thus, Heidegger declines the second modality of dealing from which he will primarily understand the Greek conception of being: from the perspective of the part of the soul that promotes reflection, "another possibility of dealing in the sense of that which organizes, which reflects by occupying itself, subsists in relation to the entity that can also be different from how it is, the entity that in the transaction itself must first of all be put into work, treated or produced. This modality of the custody of the being is the α τέχνη"[11], and what this form of knowledge unveils or reveals in the soul is ei[do" (aspect), for example, of the house, the aspect, the "'face', how it should be there and what constitutes its authentic presence. Everything is anticipated in a deliberation in the soul" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 42) [...]. "The εἶδος, therefore, is the ἀρχή [principle]; from it begins κίνησις [movement]. This κίνησις is initially the κίνησις of ποίησις [production], of the action that arises from reflection" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 43).

It is precisely in *Dasein's technical* relationship with the world that lies the tendency towards a more *autonomous* knowledge, a tendency towards *theōria* rooted in *Dasein* itself as its most proper possibility. In this respect, guided by the tendency towards a *more* (εἰδέναι μᾶλλον) *knowledge,* factual life neglects or even abandons its interest in the practical relationship with the world, and the tendency to care for the authentic self as *existence* is transformed into a pure and self-sufficient contemplation and, therefore, sterile and devitalizing. Hence the questions: what would be the historical element (*das Historische*) for human life understood simply as pure abiding in the contemplation of the archai (*principles*)? How is it possible to have apodictic knowledge about the authentic historicity *of an entity that can be otherwise*, as is the case of the object of τέχνή How to finally understand Aristotle's surprising statement, according to which the σοφία is the ἀρετή of τέχνη, If the latter has as its theme the being that can also be otherwise, while the former has as its theme what is always in an eminent sense? Even though we simultaneously use the lecture from the winter semester of 1924/1925 (GA 19) due to its more complete approach, in the *Natorp Heidegger* Report we are interested in three questions in relation to *Metaphysics* I, chapters 1-2, which we now turn to decline following this work.

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[11] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 375.

A. The phenomenological structure of dianoetic virtues – epistēmē and sophia

First, Heidegger sets out to show the phenomenological structure of both ἐπιστήμη and σοφία, thus staded in the *Natorp Report*: "The phenomenal structure of the observer`s tract, which determines causal connections (ἐπιστήμη) according to its intentional horizon (*Worauf*) and reference (*Bezug*); the phenomenal structure of the highest possible temporal maturation of this tract, the authentically observant understanding (σοφία) while taking into custody the ἀρχαί"[12]. Based on this intention, Heidegger does not limit himself to translating the Greek term ἐπιστήμη as "science" or "knowledge", but reveals what the *performance* of the phenomenon indicated by the Greek concept as such should be, since the essential expressions for *knowing, understanding,* and *comprehending*, before *gradually* assuming a specifically theoretical meaning as a general doctrine of science, had practical dimensions in man`s dealings with his surrounding world (*environing world, world-around*) (*Umwelt*): for instance, "someone understands his profession", that is, he "knows" what he does, his thing (*Sache*); he literally "understands" (Heidegger, 1993, p. 207)[13]. Is it not from this aspect that one should understand, phenomenologically, Heidegger`s statement according to which "all behavior of *Dasein* is thus determined as πρᾶξις καὶ ἀλήθεια", that is, as action and unveiling? (Heidegger, 1992, p. 39). It is also understood how Heidegger understands the type of causes that become a theme in philosophical research: "Aristotle does not deduce the idea of science from an abstract concept, but deepens what is already understood by natural being-there. Aristotle seeks to bring to the concept what is already known in pre-theoretical consciousness" (Heidegger, 1993, p. 212). Therefore, in his interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, in 1922, Heidegger translated ἐπιστήμη as "the observing, discursive and demonstrative determination" and, in his exposition on the first two chapters of *Metaphysics I* of the same year, he nuances his translation of the same Aristotelian concept: "observing treatment, which determines causal connections"[14]. As for the concept of σοφία, in addition to that already mentioned, Heidegger also defined it in his reading of *Nicomachean Ethics* as follows: "the understanding that authentically sees, the pure apprehension"[15]. In addition to this double task that Heidegger imposes on himself in his phenomenological appropriation of Aristotle, he also intends to understand *Physics*

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[12] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 387.

[13] Transcrição de Hermann Mörchen.

[14] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 376.387.

[15] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 377.

and its object in light of the conclusions obtained in *Metaphysics* I, that is, "according to the *delimitation of its object* outlined based on the idea of pure understanding, according to its *principle* (the specific critical foundation) and according to the method of categorical explanation" [16].

In the lecture of the summer semester of 1924 entitled "Fundamental Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy" (GA 18), Heidegger questions Aristotelian concepts based on three points of view, since what is at stake at this moment is the concept in its conceptuality (*Begrifflichkeit*). Now, "the aim of the evidence of conceptuality is already in this, to make you *feel* that in conceptuality itself what constitutes the *realization of questioning and determining in every scientific research is mobilized*" (Heidegger, 2002, p. 14). Hence the questions that aim to *understand* the phenomenon enclosed in the conceptuality of ἐπιστήμη and of σοφία and not simply take notice:1st) What is the *fundamental experience* that makes the *thingly character* accessible to me, an experience implicit in the dealings of life with its world? "What was before Aristotle`s eyes as movement, what phenomena of movement did he see?" These are questions posed not to know a conceptual content, but to know how the thing itself is experienced, that is, 2) how is what is *primarily called in question* [*ansprechen*] originally seen? 3) What is the specific character of comprehensibility, the specific *tendency towards comprehensibility*? (Heidegger, 2002, p. 13-14). 1) What is the *fundamental experience* that makes the character of the thing accessible to me, the experience implicit in life`s dealings with its world? an experience implicit in the dealings of life with its world? "What was before Aristotle`s eyes as movement, what phenomena of movement did he see?" These are questions posed not to know a conceptual content, but to know how the thing itself is experienced, that is, 2) how is what is *primarily called in question* [*ansprechen*] originally seen? 3) What is the specific character of comprehensibility, the specific *tendency towards comprehensibility*? (Heidegger, 2002, p. 13-14). It is certainly not a tendency towards an apophantic statement of theoretical knowledge when I state in the judgment "the pen is blue". In this sense, the situation of the concepts ἐπιστήμη and σοφία não it is not accessible in the definition of essence, as has traditionally been done based on the theoretical apprehension of things (based on the difference between *gender* and *species*), but in factual life based on the pre-theoretical donation of meaning in a surrounding world (*Umwelt*): "conceptuality thought of in fundamental concepts" is a fundamental experience of the given thing as it is a *calling into question (ansprechen)* something, that is, "expressing oneself as 'talking about...' *is the fundamental way of being of life*, that is, of being-in-a-world". As determined by the λόγος, "the fundamental way of being of man in his world is to speak (*sprechen*) with the world, about the world, of the world" (Heidegger, 2002, p. 21.18). In this *speaking*, as a pragmatic *dealing* with things, we

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[16] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 387.

already glimpse the revaluation of the original *praxis*, claimed by Heidegger as the practical-productive origin of *sophia*, *praxis* understood as the being of being-there, oriented by φρόνησις, the most appropriate way of understanding life in its rational character, that is, as a *world*.

This *world* opens up within man`s being-there, not as a subject capable of will as a subjective preliminary condition, but as the ontological character of human existence itself, as Heidegger will later state in *Being and Time*, § 14:" 'world' is not ontologically a determination *of* the being, which in its essence *Dasein* is not, but a character of being of Dasein itself" (Heidegger, 2012, p. 64/201). In this *speaking* with his/ her own world the human being does not project the meaning of things at all, if we wish to understand the genuine meaning of Heidegger`s ambiguous statement: "remissions and significance are open *in* being-there, but this does not in fact mean that they are opened *by* being-there" (Costa, 2003, p. 221). A subjectivist interpretation is not at issue here in the sense that the coherence that characterizes a world depends on a subject in which it opens. Now, *being-in-a-world* in the sense of letting '"be', in a preliminary way, "does not mean bringing or producing a being, but discovering, in usability, something already always 'being', and thus letting the being find itself. that has such a being" (Heidegger, 2012, § 18, p. 85/253). If I say, for example, the pen *is used to write*'', here the thing itself, as an intramundane entity, occurs immediately in a context of practical knowledge, in a network of remissions and based on a concrete dealing with the surrounding world. *Knowing what for* is not the same thing as *knowing how* to *use it correctly*, since *knowing how to use it* is *a particular way of accessing the thing that only some possess*, therefore implying more specific levels of knowledge: what characterizes the being of the usable is its *conformation or functionality* (*Bewandtnis*), that is, the being of the intramundane thing is its being *in function of*: the qualities of the entity are discovered only in the concrete treatment, but discovered does not mean created (*cf.* Costa, 2003, p. 210-212).

B. The description of the phenomenon of pure contemplation – theōrein

Secondly, Heidegger wishes to follow the *path* that led Aristotle to gain access to the phenomenon of *pure understanding* and its mode of interpretation. From the genealogical aspect of the idea of pure contemplation, there is no distinction with regard to the tendency proper to factual life as a practical dealing (*Umgang*) with the world. Both access to the phenomenon of *pure understanding* as such and its interpretation are characteristic of the fundamental meaning of "philosophy". An example of this meaning is the predominance of Greek *conceptuality* with an eminently theoretical appropriation in such a way that, having gone through a chain of different interpretations, "the fundamental concepts lost their original expressive functions, carved in a determined way in equally determined

regions of object"[17]. Based on theoretical understandings of the phenomenon of *pure contemplation* in the history of philosophy, there was no originality in the interpretation of factual life as a possibility of radically taking possession of itself, and this means for Heidegger that life renounces the possibility of having *to be*. In this sense, rescuing factual life in its facticity, insofar as the possibility of an existence, authentically appropriated and brought into custody that matures over time, is inherent in it, implies radically questioning "the transmitted and sovereign interpretivity in its hidden motivations, in its unexpressed tendencies and interpretative pathways to move towards the original motivational origins of explanation *in the deconstructive return. Hermeneutics undertakes its task only on the path of destruction*"[18].

C. The ontological character of sofiva and its rooting in factual life

Thirdly, Heidegger intends to make explicit "the character of being of σοφία as such and its performance (*Leistung*) is constitutive for the being of human life". This claim is briefly announced here and passionately pursued later, especially in § 9 of the first chapter and in the second chapter, respectively, of the lecture of the winter semester of 1924/1925 (GA 19), entitled "the analysis of σοφία (*Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 6-7)*"* and "the genesis of σοφία in the interior of the natural being-there of the Greeks"[19], as we will see in the rest of this study. The three perspectives outlined above are interdependent, "in such a way that the structure of pure understanding becomes comprehensible only on the basis of its essential rooting in factual life"[20]. With regard to the rooting of σοφία in factual life and from the modality of its genesis in it, the questions posed in *the Natorp Report* are the following: "how is it there at the start, what Aristotle characterizes as research? Where and as what-thing (*als was*) is it to be found? How does Aristotle get there and how does he deal with it?" [21]. Now, Aristotle assumes factual life in the modality of his own colloquial, everyday speech when he characterizes the wise man and, in this way, wisdom. In this sense, it is the discourse about σοφώτερον – the being that understands more than another, that is, the discourse

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[17] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 367.

[18] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 368.

[19] Heidegger, 1992, p. 57-64 (§ 9, capítulo primeiro); p. 65-131 (§§ 10 a 17: *Die Genesis der σοφία im natürlichen Dasein*).

[20] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 387.

[21] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 387.

that "maintains to the factual *subsumptions* (*Dafürnahmen*: [assumed beliefs]) in which life interprets its own modalities of treatmént".

Aristotle establishes this discourse in the comparative form, which "makes visible what matters to life when it calls into question something like σοφώτερον: the μᾶλλον εἰδέναι, the 'more' *(das Mehr)* in observing [knowing more than, seeing more than]"[22]. The *wiser* than another factually implies the fact that there is a concern to achieve a greater understanding in an original way within the pragmatic treatment of being-there with the world. It is precisely in this tendency towards "more" in observation that factual life comes to "renounce the care of execution (*Verrichtung*). The operative with-what of dealing (*Womit des Umgans*) becomes the a-what (*Worauf*) of mere observation." But, from the point of view of the practical genesis of wisdom, "in this 'more' of observation, the 'aspect' (*Aussehen*) of the with-what of the deal becomes visible, and precisely not as the object of theoretical determination, but as the a-what (*Worauf*) of the organizing occupation". Here is the idea, according to which the "aspect" (for example, of a disease: ἰατρεύειν = "to treat in a medical way") has the character of why, and this has an originally practical meaning. In this sense, the prerequisite for realizing is already living in truth while understanding the thing appropriately, since the "aspect" of what must be produced is given in its λέγειν.

According to Heidegger`s phenomenological interpretation of this tendency to *know more* than others, factual life, as a *relational sense* of care, abandons the interest in pragmatic dealings with the world as it seeks a *cure* through theoretical knowledge to its highest degree: *theōrein* as intellectual apprehension of things whose causes cannot be different. Based on this autonomous relationship of wisdom as more knowledge, "the purely observant approach, however, shows itself to be such that in its a-que (*Worauf*) it no longer sees, precisely, the life in which it [the approach] is [or is rooted]". Therefore, this horizon of a specific search is no longer of a practical nature, but fundamentally theoretical. There is no other conclusion than that in which wisdom constitutes for Aristotle the extreme of the tendency to care, a tendency rooted in factual life itself as its most proper possibility: "the tendency to care has transferred itself to observing as such [*theōrein*]. This becomes more and more an independent deal and as such the a-que (*Worauf*) of an occupation (*Besorgnis*) of its own"[23], an occupation that will become the "care of known knowledge", in Heidegger`s criticism of his master Husserl through the assumptions Cartesians of phenomenology in the winter semester lecture of 1923/1924 (GA 17): that is, with regard to the being of knowing,

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[22] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 387-388.

[23] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 389.388

it is a care of certainty, "while stopping at a peculiar distance from being, that is, in a state that does not allow knowledge characterized in this way to reach the being of itself, but which interrogates each being with respect to its character of possible being-right" (Heidegger, 1994 [GA 17], p. 285-286). This *specific motility* is "escape from knowledge before oneself in the mode of hiding" (Heidegger, 1994, p. 288), "the visible being with the being that is in the world. This *co-visibility* is expressed in *there*. Being-there [*Dasein*] is here and now, in *being-always-every-time* (*Jeweiligkeit* = eachness, paticular whileness, temporal particularity), is *factual. Facticity* is not a concretion of the universal, but the original determination of its specific being as being-there" (Heidegger, 1994, p. 288-289).

The abandonment of pragmatic dealings with the world based on the predominance of *pure contemplation* is a liberation, since wisdom is not sought for any usefulness, states Aristotle: "just as we call a free man the one who is an end for himself and not for another, so we consider this [the σοφία], among all other sciences, as the only free science, since this is only for itself"[24]. As man is a slave in many ways – that is, "a slave to prejudices, a slave to the dominant opinion, a slave to his own state of mind, his own drives and his own demands" (Heidegger, 1993, p. 30) –, Aristotle understands σοφία as the most authentic and divine science, and Heidegger critically interprets this statement: "the idea of the divine, however, did not develop in Aristotle in the explanation of an object made accessible in fundamental religious experience; the θεῖον is, rather, the expression of the character of the highest being that results from the ontological radicalization of the idea of the moved-being". Therefore, according to the traditional interpretation, wisdom is not divine in the religious sense: *pure understanding* is divine precisely because it is "free from *all emotional* reference to its toward-what (*Worauf*). The 'divine' cannot be envious not because this is the absolute good and love, but because in general, in its being as pure motility, it can neither hate nor love"[25].

Now, conceiving the idea of σοφία as a theoretical life without restlessness, contemplating the supreme and eternal being (the divine intellect as thought of thought) and, therefore, with an absence of practical purpose, comes from the impossibility on the part of Aristotle of explicitly thinking about the primacy of *ousía* as "the being in as of its being", that is, this "how of being designates *being-there under the mode of being-available*" (Heidegger, 2002, p. 22.24.25). By turning to the current meaning of *ousía* ("wealth", "goods", "heritage", "property) it is possible to "hear" how the natural being-there speaks to its world and, in this way, to unveil the co-signification of the

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[24] Aristóteles, *Metaphysics* I, 982b 24-28.

[25] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 389.

scientific, philosophical, terminological or ontological meaning of *ousía* (See. Sommer, 2005, p. 67s): ""the very being of an entity still has determining moments", from which it is still possible to 'say something about the entity in the how of its being' (Heidegger, 2002, p. 21-22). The sense of being of the ousía concept is rooted in the philosopher`s concrete, everyday life, in the natural attitude. As Christian Sommer well observed, in Aristotle we deal with an *ontology of the world* that, commanded by the technological model (from Herstellen in the sense of producing and making available [Herstellen] the entity in a stabilized and manipulable presence), transfers the meaning of intramundane being (ousía: constant and produced presence [*Anwesenheit*][26] for the human being as such (*Cf.* Sommer, 2005, p. 74-76). But, for Heidegger, hermeneutic phenomenology, far from being an ontology of the 'world' as "the totality of the being simply present within the world", is an interpretation of the presence of human being-there in its ontological motility from time. In other words: time is the being of movement itself as *motility* of human being-there, that is, temporality (*Zeitlichkeit = temporal*) as the meaning of *Dasein*`s being, and that mode of temporality (*Temporalatität = temporality*) that constitutes the meaning of being in general[27]. In this sense, the Aristotelian idea of a supreme being thinking itself outside of all movement prevents us from viewing this *motility* of human being-there as ek-static temporality: "the one-like mobility [*Wie*] of temporality, of facticity" (Heidegger, 1988, p. 65). If, therefore, *phenomenon* in the phenomenological sense is not so much the being that appears, but its *how* (*Wie*), and considering that the fundamental characterization of human being-there is not substantial, but *deitic*, that is, *spatio-temporal*, factual existence can only be understood as *pre-availability of being*, that is, factual possibility in the existential sense: this means, therefore, *having-the-capacity-of,* the power to understand a possible something of the experienceable in general; in this way, the being-capable-of (*vermögen*) of factual being-there shows that phenomenological understanding is irreducible to mere factual or theoretical understanding. It is in his eagerness to destroy the ontology of the world that Heidegger phenomenologically interprets the fundamental categories of movement (δύναμις and ἐνέργεια)

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[26] Heidegger, 1994, p. 46: "Οὐσία gives the fundamental character of being as being: presence. It is implicitly co-signified in the so-called concepts of 'thing' (*Ding*)". The term "*Ding*" indicates the "thing in a corporeal, material sense, thus distinguishing itself from the expression 'Sache', which refers to the 'thing in question', the 'question', the 'cause'".

[27] The German term *Temporalität* concerns the "determination-of-time" of all phenomena, starting with "temporality". (*Temporalität*) of existence qua being for the world itself". Hence the definition of the Heideggerian project there between 1925-1926: "The task of a phenomenological chronology is the investigation of the time-determination of phenomena, that is, of their temporality (*Temporalität*) – and therefore the investigation of time itself": Heidegger, 1976, p. 409.200. In 1927 with *Sein um Zeit* Heidegger distinguishes between temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of *Dasein* from temporiality (*Temporalität*) of simply being, which was not the case in 1926, where time was treated as a "Existenzial of Dasein" and, in this respect, constitutes the foundation of logic.

when declining his program of reiterative destruction of Aristotle in the first Marburg lecture of 1923/1924. After mentioning the fundamental distinction *of the four determinations of being* from *Metaphysics* 2, 1026-33, Heidegger judges that such determinations are the living motives through which research moves: one of the senses of being as δύναμις [→ *the entity in power* = ὂν δυνάμει)] e ἐνέργεια [→ *the entity in act* = ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν]

> it is drawn from a specific comprehension of life itself insofar as "being-alive" means being-a-possibility. Both [potentiality and actuality] only refer to life as existence in a world. "Life" is itself thereby conceived as a worldly happening [weltlich Vorkom mendes] that has the peculiarity of being authentic in its being-present-as finished [in seinem Femg-anwesend-sein]. In Greek ontology, which is an ontology of the "world," it is precisely "life" (as being in the world) that furnishes the distinguishing characters (Heidegger, 1994 [GA 17], p. 51-52; trad. em inglês por Daniel O. Dahlstrom de 2005, p. 39).

3. From the tendency towards *poiēsis* to its transformation into *theōria* under the aspect of an ontological priority: simultaneity of the phenomena of production and pure contemplation (Aristotle) or a derivative character of *theōria* (Heidegger)?

Based on the dense analyses developed both in the Fribourg lecture of the summer semester of 1922 (GA 62) and in the Marburg lecture of the winter semester of 1924/1925 – "Plato: the Sophist" (GA 19) –, it is clear that Heidegger defends the conception according to which the σοφία is an original tendency of *Dasein*, which is executed through the path that goes from the productive relationship to pure contemplation. The tendency towards this *theōria* is called *the tendency towards collapse*, that is, towards a decay that moves away from the practical relationship with the things we deal with on a daily basis in our surrounding world. The difference between Aristotle and Heidegger lies precisely in this: while Aristotle describes the simultaneity of the phenomena of *poiēsis* and *theōria* – even while recognizing a temporal priority with regard to the productive sciences[28] –, For Heidegger, not only is the meaning of both being rooted in facticity decisive, but above all the fact that σοφία , as a tendency to *pure contemplation*, is a *derived* form, rooted in the facticity of *Dasein* and, therefore, based on an ontological priority. Despite this and other differences from an exegetical reading of Aristotelian texts, to understand the novelty of the ontologization of the concepts of

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[28] See. Aristóteles, *Metaphysics* I, 2, 982b, 22-24: "quando já existiam quase todas as coisas necessárias e também aquelas relativas ao descanso e ao bem-estar, então começou a buscar-se esta forma de conhecimento (ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις)".

Aristotle`s practical philosophy in Heidegger`s appropriations, it is necessary to pay attention to the "phenomenological" character of the approach: in Aristotle`s particular research, Heidegger sees "regional ontologies" where he thematizes the structure of being specific to the respective entity considered. The process of ontologizing life or an a priori foundation of biology is already apparent in the interpretation of the principle of movement in Aristotle, not as a perception that purely observes, but as a perception that apprehends something appetizing, that is, interesting for the o[rexi" , the appetitus, with its dynamics of pursuing and fleeing: in this sense, the phenomena of "moving" (κινεῖν).

The process of the ontologization of life or an a priori foundation of biology is already evident in the interpretation of the principle of movement in Aristotle—not as purely observational perception, but as perception that apprehends something desirable, that is, something of interest to ὄρεξις (orexis), appetitus, with its dynamic of pursuit and avoidance: in this sense, the phenomena of "movement" (κινεῖν), *towards something* in the world at each given time, and of "highlighting (κρίνειν) something in relation to another (differentiating)[29] constitute life.

In interpretively translating the opening of Aristotle`s *Metaphysics* (A, 1, 980 a 21-27) in the lecture *Phenomenological Interpretations of Selected Treatises of Aristotle on Logic and Ontology* (1922), Heidegger states: "the desire to live in seeing [in absorbing oneself in what is visible] is something, which is part of *man`s being*-as [journalistic mode of being]. This being-as of man is expressed in the fact that he (preferably) likes to live in a way that always does something new and gets to know others" (Heidegger, 2005, p. 17). This *being*-as of man, as seeing-liking, is so rooted in man that such modalities of knowing are free from the performance of realization and fulfillment of occupation tendencies [of the given sphere of performance]. In this sense, the meaning of "knowing" here in Aristotle is interpreted in the direction of the multiple ways of "seeing" (*Sehen*) - that is, how to grasp in the broadest sense -, of being absorbed in what can be seen, of looking at something, of looking around, of looking forward and back. This "seeing", with the emphasis on sensitive perception, "has the preference of the *primary* openness of the world, in such a way that the seen can be discussed and executed in more detail in the" λόγος (Heidegger, 1992, p. 70). The emphasis on this "seeing" is also present in Heidegger`s paraphrase of the opening text of Aristotle`s *Metaphysics* ("All men tend [ὀρέγονται] by nature to knowledge")[30]: "in the being of man (*Im Sein des Menschen*) there is essentially the cure (*Sorge*) of seeing" (Heidegger, 1979, p. 380). Referring to

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[29] See. Aristóteles, *De anima* Γ 2, 426 b 10.

[30] Aristóteles, *Metaphysics* I 1, 980 a, 21.

the appetitive character, as already dealt with through the *concupiscence of the eyes* in Augustine with regard to the "simple *will to see*" (naked curiosity *as* the dominant sense), for Heidegger the theoretical attitude is rooted in "natural" experience and proceeds from a fixation of desire on the world which thus becomes the end of delight (See Heidegger, 1995, p. 224).

What is at stake in the first three levels of "knowledge" (*sensation-experience-technique*) in *Metaphysics* 1, is the "being-oriented of being-there, being-discovered, and being-visible" (Heidegger, 1992, p. 69). It is possible to associate these forms of "seeing" with some productive relationship (*poiēsis*) as a preliminary stage to pure contemplation (σοφία), as Heidegger intends in his interpretation of the derived character of *theōria*? Only based on the scope of the original relations of cohesion between the *producing* (τέχνη) goods of a certain type (the construction of a house, for example) and *science* (ἐπιστήμη) that reaches the truth through elaborations of reasoning it is possible to glimpse the Heideggerian thesis. What are the *principles* of these two dianoetic virtues as increasingly specific levels of *understanding* (*Vernehmen*) in general? On the one hand, in relation to τέχνη, for example, "when the master builder builds a house, he lives and moves first and foremost in the house, in the how of his e-vision" (Heidegger, 2002, p. 35), and this being relative to production (ποιούμενον) "as a circumspection that illuminates *this* deal" occurs in its full worldly-environmental significance: this sense of the house`s being "has its origins in the originally given surrounding world", fully experienced[31], its contingency (*Mithaftigkeit*) is seen. There is no possible production without a specimen that serves as a model that must be made with a view to building the house. On the other hand, with regard to σοφία, These are causal connections, the essence of which precisely evokes the formal εἶδος as well as the εἶδος of the theory. As Carmen S. Peraita rightly observed, "the inexcusable presence of *eidos* in technique is the reason why there is already a tendency to free itself from production and become autonomous. Eidos therefore operates as an essential binding element between production and contemplation" (SEGURA PERAITA, 2002, p. 130). Thus, Heidegger states in the *Natorp Report*:

> As the task of making an object field explicitly accessible arises, and this not only in determining theory, the 'from-where' must be available from the outset as unveiled.' (*Vonwoaus*) (ἀρχή) of λέγειν. From ἀρχή this takes its starting point by looking at it in such a way that it keeps this starting point in its 'eye' as a constant fundamental orientation[32] (our translation).

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[31] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 398-399.

[32] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 382.

The principles of both dianoetic virtues of τέχνη and σοφία are, therefore, therefore *originally* self-evident: it is a question of understanding, while keeping in view, the starting point as intentionality. Both dianoetic virtues reach the truth on the basis of a type of "seeing", increasingly specific to the point of cognitive apprehension, exactly as Aristotle describes and distinguishes the different degrees of human knowledge on the threshold of *Metaphysics* I. In fact, all virtues related to the thinking part of the soul are distinguished by a type of "seeing". Otherwise, there would be no justification for calling them "dianoetic virtues". Finally, how can we understand the structure of pure understanding *only* "on the basis of its essential rooting in factual life and the modality of its *genesis in this*"[33]? It is precisely through the genesis of σοφία in the structure of factual life, based on its temporal character of experience in the first two chapters of Aristotle`s *Metaphysics* I, which makes possible to uncover the "transformation that leads from the temporal relationship to the conditional, from this to the formal-eidetic and, finally, to the causal, immediate condition of contemplation and thus of the pre-eminence of the present and of presence as the guiding meaning of being" (SEGURA PERAITA, 2002, p. 130), which is originally the *being-produced*: "This being, in what it is, It is originally only for the treatment that produces it and no longer for the one that uses it, insofar as the latter can take the manufactured object from different perspectives, no longer originating, of caring"[34].

CONCLUSION

In the programmatic announcement of his appropriation of Aristotle in the second part of the *Natorp Report*, Heidegger shows his peculiar approach to the texts of the Greek philosopher, an appropriation that is not at all conventional. In the heterogeneous network of relationships with the works of Aristotle, both in the first phase of his teaching in Freiburg (1919-1923) and in the Marburg phase (1923-1928) or even in the later Freiburg period (1928-1944), there is a wide range of modulations that allow us to glimpse a very specific understanding of Heidegger as a "*reader* of Aristotle". In this expression, "*reader*" implies a *refined interpretation* of the Stagirite in order to open new avenues of investigation for thought in the philosophical debate of the period in which Heidegger lived. It was in his confrontation with Aristotle that Heidegger would recover and update the philosophical problems addressed in his works. As Franco Volpi rightly observed in his work "Heidegger and Aristotle" (2010), it is worth "emphasizing that the fruitfulness of the German philosopher`s bond with Aristotle does not reside so much in the interpretations of the texts as

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[33] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 387.

[34] M. Heidegger, *Natorp-Bericht,* In: Heidegger, 2005, p. 398.

such, but in the ability to recover and make current the philosophical problems they present" (Volpi, 2012, p. 25). In a word: it is about reviving and reinjecting new light into the speculative substance of the text. In this way, Heidegger revitalized, with a phenomenological-hermeneutic appropriation, the fundamental questions that Aristotle first posed, and this with a view to thinking with acute sensitivity about the problems of our time, such as, for example, "the decline of religious consciousness, the crisis of traditional values and the distrust of merely instrumental reason, the end of the absolute on Earth and the inevitable closure of the epochal horizon of technology" (Volpi, 2012, p. 25). Finally, Günter Figal rightly highlighted the decisive importance of Aristotle for Heidegger: "the 'phenomenology of acts of consciousness' goes back to an activity that Aristotle calls *alētheuein (unconcealing).* The essence of human life, or "Dasein", as Heidegger will resolve in connection with Aristotle, is to uncover or reveal" (Figal, 2022, p. 63).

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