A Crítica de Nietzsche à Negação da Vontade de Schopenhauer Enquanto Manifestação da Decadência

Abstract

This article aims to presente Nietzsche’s critics to Schopenhauer’s morality in his proposal of the denial of the will as a manifestation of decadence. In efect, the most contundent objetction the Nietzsche will provide against the morality of Schopenhauer is related to the consideration of morality as a judgment of value, in which the denial of the will presents itself as a manifestation of decadence, because in the final stage of his philosophical production the denial of the will apears as a judgment of value that springs from a weakened vital condition and phisiopsychologically diseased. Therefore, the critcism from Nietzsche to the denial of life and of the will as they appear in Schopenhauer’s philosophy isert themselves in the contexto of morality as a judgment of value, in which the schopenhauerian doctrine of the denial of the will emerges as a symptom of a décadent vital formation.