Nietzsche e os marcos críticos do feminismo

Verdade, emancipação e esclarecimento “da mulher”

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to interpret Nietzsche’s critique of emancipatory feminism under the aegis of the “enlightenment on the self...” of women (BM, Our Virtues, 232). Our hypothesis is that such a critique would point out that feminism is based on — and remains marked by — an instrumental reason derived from the faith in the intrinsically masculine truth criterion of the Western philosophical tradition (knowledge instinct/truth instinct). We will outline how such a belief eventually not only permeates first-wave feminist ideology (forged in the wake of the values of the French Revolution), but comports it, reflecting a certain alienation of woman’s “self” from a feasible “in-itself”. For this, we will use aphorism 232 from Beyond Good and Evil as a privileged reference for our reading. Following, we will show that the problem of feminism, endorsed by the Enlightenment notions of emancipation and enlightenment, for Nietzsche, is conditioned by the passive acceptance of man’s scientific way of being (and its truths). To conclude, we will take stock of the main discussions that have taken place in the course of this writing by remarking on important concepts such as that of body and nature. For, if in fact rational behavior reflects man’s artificial self and ultimately provides a subjective model to be applied to feminine nature, then we are inclined to hold that the task properly feminist and, consequently, “woman’s”, should be alternatively: the elaboration of herself from her own aesthetic potentialities conformed solely and exclusively to her creative (counter-imitative) nature.