The obscure content of hallucination

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v8i1.23760

Resumo

Michael Tye (2009) proposed a way of understanding the content of hallucinatory experiences. Somewhat independently, Mark Johnston (2004) provided us with elements to think about the content of hallucination. In this paper, their views are compared and evaluated. Both their theories present intricate combinations of conjunctivist and disjunctivist strategies to account for perceptual content. An alternative view (called “the epistemic conception of hallucination”), which develops a radically disjunctivist account, is considered and rejected. Finally, the paper raises some metaphysical difficulties that seem to threaten any conjunctivist theory and to lead the debate to a dilemma: strong disjunctivists cannot explain the subjective indistinguishability between veridical and hallucinatory experiences, whereas conjunctivists cannot explain what veridical and hallucinatory experiences have in common. This dilemma is left here as an open challenge.

Biografia do Autor

  • Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves, Professor Adjunto DTECH/UFSJ Professor Permanente PPGFIL/UFSJ

    Professor Adjunto DTECH/UFSJ
    Professor Permanente PPGFIL/UFSJ

    Ph.D. em Filosofia - University of Texas at Austin (EUA), 2014

    Mestre em Filosofia - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), 2008

    Bacharel em Filosofia - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), 2004

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Publicado

05-09-2019

Edição

Seção

Dossiê Filosofia da Mente e da Linguagem

Como Citar

Alves, M. A. S. (2019). The obscure content of hallucination. Sofia , 8(1), 30-53. https://doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v8i1.23760