For a moderate naturalism?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v11i2.31861Keywords:
naturalized epistemology, normativity, traditional epistemology, moderate naturalism, Alvin GoldmanAbstract
In this paper, we will discuss Alvin Goldman's naturalism in relation to the question of the normativity of epistemology. For this, we review the presentation that this author makes of knowledge and justification understood under a naturalistic approach. It is intended to understand how Goldman incorporates elements of traditional speculative epistemology to his naturalistic point of view. We present some distinctions, made by Goldman himself, in order to clarify the different approaches that a naturalist stance in epistemology can take and to discuss his formulation of a moderate naturalism. In the end, we try to present some weaknesses of this pretension to think about the question of whether a moderate naturalism is necessary.
Resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é debater como desenvolve o seu conceito de diferença, na obra Diferença e repetição, propondo reverter a submissão da diferença à identidade na analogia do juízo, que possui duas funções: distribuir os seres e os sujeitos e hierarquizá-los de acordo com as regras do fundamento. Para tanto, o filósofo confrontou as posições de sedentarismo e hierarquia do pensamento da representação, em nome de um modo de se dispor anárquico e nômade, ou seja, abolindo a noção de hierarquia e reformulado a perspectiva do limite. A hipótese a ser investigada é a seguinte: em que medida o conceito de diferença em si mesma, de acordo com o seu aspecto catastrófico que provoca um abismamento no solo do fundamento, reverte a sua posição ante à analogia do juízo e oferece um novo modo de pensar criticamente, conferindo novas características ao domínio da ontologia.
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