The problem of unobserved anomalies
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v11i2.39178Keywords:
instrumentalism, pessimistic induction, scientific antirealism, unconceived alternatives, unobserved anomaliesAbstract
Scientific antirealism, the view that successful theories are empirically adequate, is untenable in light of the problem of unobserved anomalies that since past scientists could not observe the anomalies that caused the replacement of past theories with present theories, present scientists cannot observe the anomalies either that will cause the replacement of present theories with future theories. There are several moves that antirealists would be tempted to make to get around the problem of unobserved anomalies. All of them, however, are problematic.
Resumo
O antirrealismo científico, ou seja, a visão de que as teorias bem-sucedidas são somente empiricamente adequadas, é insustentável à luz do problema das anomalias não-observadas. Esse problema pode ser descrito da seguinte forma: já que os cientistas do passado não puderam observar as anomalias que causaram a substituição das teorias passadas pelas teorias atuais, os cientistas de hoje também não podem observar as anomalias que causarão a substituição das teorias presentes por teorias futuras. Há várias estratégias que os antirrealistas seriam tentados a oferecer para contornar o problema das anomalias não-observadas. Todas elas, no entanto, são problemáticas.
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