Crença, probabilidade e loteria: Uma introdução à epistemologia formal da crença

Matheus de Lima Rui

doi:10.47456/sofia.v15i1.52545

Authors

Matheus de Lima Rui Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina https://orcid.org/0009-0005-5038-6153

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v15i1.52545

Keywords:

epistemology, belief, rationality, bayesianism, probability

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present how the notions of belief and subjective probability appear in the contemporary epistemological debate on rationality. The main way of analyzing this relationship is through what we call a “bridge principle”: a formal principle capable of connecting the rationality of belief with the rationality of subjective probability. The central challenge in constructing a bridge principle lies in the difficulty of linking qualitative and quantitative models without generating a paradox, such as the well-known Lottery Paradox. We present here some possible alternatives to this paradoxical situation, as well as a proposal for a bridge principle that takes the concept of belief to be context-dependent: the Humean theory of belief.

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Author Biography

Matheus de Lima Rui, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Atualmente realiza estágio de pós-doutorado no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia na Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Foi professor substituto na área de Lógica e Epistemologia do departamento de Filosofia na Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), entre 2024 e 2025. Doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC). Mestre em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPel). Tem experiência na área de Filosofia, com ênfase em Epistemologia Formal, Bayesianismo, Lógica, Teoria da Ação e da Escolha Racional. Bolsista CAPES, sob orientação do prof. Dr. Alexandre Meyer Luz, e coorientação do prof. Dr. Jonas Becker Arenhart. Foi membro de corpo editorial do periódico Seara Filosófica (UFPel).

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