From objections to KNA to a case for a hearer-centered norm of assertion
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v14i2.49040Keywords:
assertion, KNA, Timothy Williamson, Jennifer Lackey, testimony, selfless asserterAbstract
An assertion is generally understood as a speech act in the form of a statement meant to impart something of epistemic significance: we assert to clarify, inform, teach, and improve a hearer’s epistemic status. Epistemologist Timothy Williamson (1996) claims that the nature of assertion is intrinsically normative: assertion has a constitutive norm. That norm, according to Williamson, is that the asserter ought to know the content of the assertion (the “knowledge norm of assertion” or “KNA”). In this paper, I examine (a) Williamson’s argument for a constitutive norm of assertion and (b) whether that norm must be knowledge. I will argue, particularly through Jennifer Lackey’s famous case of the creationist teacher, that an asserter can – and often does – consistently impart something of epistemic significance to a hearer without fully satisfying the KNA. I conclude with a recommendation that KNA, albeit an intuitive expectation about asserters, is not a necessary condition for assertion in epistemically successful assertoric practices.
References
FERREIRA FILHO, João B. Outlines for a metatheory of expertise from the veritistic approach and its main problems. Peri, Florianópolis, v. 16, n. 2, p. 75-88, 2024.
GASZCZYK, Grzegorz. The informativeness norm of assertion. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, v. 15, p. 1157-1178, 2024.
GASZCZYK, Grzegorz. A critique of Turri’s experimental research on selfless assertions. Diametros, v. 16, n. 59, p. 23-34, 2019.
GOLDBERG, Sanford C. Recent work on assertion. American Philosophical Quarterly, v. 52, n. 4, p. 365-380, 2015.
GOLDMAN, Alvin I. A causal theory of knowing. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 64, n. 12, p. 257-275, 1967.
GRECO, John. What is transmission? Episteme, v. 13, n. 4, p. 481-498, 2016.
GREEN, Christopher R. The epistemic parity of testimony, Memory, and Perception. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame. 2006.
KVANVIG, Jonathan. Assertion, knowledge, and lotteries. In: GREENOUGH, P.; PRITCHARD, D. (Eds.). Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 140-160.
LACKEY, Jennifer. Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
LACKEY, Jennifer. Norms of assertion. Noûs, v. 41, n. 4, p. 594-626, 2007.
PLANTINGA, Alvin. Epistemic justification. Noûs, v. 20, n. 1, p. 3-18, 1986.
SORENSEN, Roy. Epistemic paradoxes. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/ .
TURRI, John. Selfless assertions: some empirical evidence. Synthese, v. 192, p. 1221-1233, 2015.
WEINER, Matthew. Must we know what we say? The Philosophical Review, v. 114, p. 227-51, 2005.
WILLIAMSON, Timothy. Knowing and asserting. The Philosophical Review, v. 105, n. 4, p. 489-523, 1996.
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 João B. Ferreira Filho
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Given the journal's open access policy, the use of published texts is free of charge, with the obligation to acknowledge the original authorship and first publication in this journal. The authors of the published contributions are entirely and exclusively responsible for their content.
I. The authors authorize the publication of the article in this journal.
II. The authors guarantee that the contribution is original and assume full responsibility for its content in the event of third-party claims.
III. The authors guarantee that the contribution is not under evaluation by another journal.
IV. The authors retain copyright and grant the journal the right of first publication, with the work licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License.
V. The authors are authorized and encouraged to disseminate and distribute their work online after publication in the journal.
VI. The authors of approved works authorize the journal to distribute their content, after publication, for reproduction in content indexes, virtual libraries, and similar platforms.
VII. The editors reserve the right to make adjustments to the text and adapt the article to the journal's editorial standards.
