The extended mind hypothesis: an anti-metaphysical vaccine

Auteurs

  • Giorgio Airoldi UNED Madrid, Spain

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v8i1.23751

Résumé

Discussions about the extended mind have ‘extended’ in various directions in the last decades. While applied to other aspects of human cognition and even consciousness, the extended-mind hypothesis has also been criticized, as it questions fundamental ideas such as the image of a dual world, divided between an external and an internal domain by the border of ‘skin and skull’, the idea of a localized and constant decision center, and the role of internal representations. We suggest that the main virtue of the hypothesis is not as a theory per se, but as a vaccine against persistent metaphysical prejudices about the mind’s structure, functions and borders. Being an hypothesis about the most efficient ways to combine resources and problems, and not a theory about the mind’s a-priori constitution, the extended mind view moves the focus from ontology to pragmatics and helps purify philosophy of mind from metaphysical remainders.

Téléchargements

Les données relatives au téléchargement ne sont pas encore disponibles.

Téléchargements

Publiée

05-09-2019

Comment citer

Airoldi, G. (2019). The extended mind hypothesis: an anti-metaphysical vaccine. Sofia , 8(1), 10–29. https://doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v8i1.23751

Numéro

Rubrique

Dossiê Filosofia da Mente e da Linguagem