Reassessing the Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism: Beyond the Distinction between Premier-Presidentialism and Presidential-Parliamentarism

Abstract

The purpose of this research note is to reassess the constitutional properties of the “presidential-parliamentary” and “prime-ministerial-presidential” varieties of semi-presidential systems. Wouldn’t the conditions under which presidential power manifests be considered variants? Are there not differences among presidential-parliamentary subtypes where the presidential dismissal of the prime minister is discretionary or dependent on parliamentary approval? Is the presidential power of dismissal restricted to prime ministers, cabinet ministers, or does it encompass both actors? What occurs in prime-ministerial-presidential systems where there is discretionary or conditional appointment of cabinet ministers by the president? By cross-analyzing differences and similarities among 26 semi-presidential countries and considering constitutions as the unit of analysis for this work, we revisit the analytical precision and empirical grounding of Shugart and Carey’s categories based on statistics regarding the behavior of six relevant variables concerning the conditions of appointment and dismissal of prime ministers and cabinet ministers. Results indicate that semi-presidential systems vary internally far beyond the boundaries of prime-ministerial-presidential and presidential-parliamentary systems.